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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Prevention and Combat of a Spillage after Ghana’s
Oil and Gas Discovery – Is Ghana Ready to face an
Environmental Threat?

Degree:

MSc

The lacuna in international law to regulate the exploitation of crude oil brings into
sharp focus the need for exploiting regimes to enact laws and establish measures and
procedures to prevent and/or combat a spillage during exploitation activities, in order
to forestall the grave damage the product can cause to the environment in the event
of a spill. Nation states which exploit crude oil have variously enacted laws to protect
their environment, but these appear to be woefully inadequate as the laws have
invariably held the exploitation companies liable for preventing accidents, and for
combating any spill in order to prevent environmental damage.
Ghana, in 2007, struck oil in commercial quantities, and began commercial
exploitation in 2010. Being a relatively new entrant on the oil extraction scene, it is
evident that there was not much regulation to protect the environment from
extraction activities, and the nation had to contend with regulating the industry after
commercial production had commenced. Again, there was a deficit in laid down
procedures to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of a spill should it occur during
exploitation. The Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico re-focused
attention on the need to regulate the exploitation industry, to curtail the unbridled
influence of the extraction companies in the provision of measures to combat an
accidental spill at the drill sites.
As a new entrant on the extraction scene, Ghana also did not have procedures in
place to streamline the efforts of agencies who would be called upon to help
combat a spill should it occur, and a compensation regime for damage due to a spill
is also virtually non-existent. Lines of authority and responsibility for the regulatory
agencies are not clear-cut, leading to confusion on who to take charge of combating
a spill, and how to go about compensating those affected by a spill.
This dissertation looks at the preparations so far towards addressing these
identified shortcomings, and attempts to proffer suggestions to enhance the
effectiveness of these preparations, as well as other measures that need to be put in
place to protect Ghana’s marine environment from the debilitating effects of a spillage
of oil due to exploitation activities.
Due to the very nature of the research, the population for this research was selected
from institutions which are actively involved in regulating and exploiting the oil,
and those servicing these institutions, as well as responsible institutions for providing
security in Ghana’s maritime domain.
The researcher attempts to answer the question of whether Ghana is ready to join the
ranks of oil exploitation countries, specifically considering her preparedness to
combat environmental damage due to an oil spill as a result of exploitation activities.
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CHAPTER 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background to the Research

Crude oil originates from ancient fossilised materials having been converted into oil
over millions of years through geochemical processes. It is found in the subsoil of the
earth and oceans, and drilled in unrefined form, to be processed into petroleum
products for use. Crude oil is useful for various industries, and its products are utilised
for both domestic and industrial use. However, due to the very nature of the formation
of crude oil, it is exploited from pressurised fields, and unregulated discharge or
spillage of crude oil can have dire consequences for the environment into which it is
spilled.

Exploration for oil and its exploitation on the African continent began many years ago,
and consequently, spillages of oil into the environment, both marine and terrestrial, is
no new occurrence. Nigeria, the largest oil exporter in Africa and the 8th largest in the
world (Workman, 2017), is Ghana’s closest neighbour in English speaking West
Africa, and has been exploiting oil for over half a century. They have had their fair
share (or perhaps more than their fair share) of spillages, some due to accidents,
many due to sabotage and ineffective maintenance of equipment, including pipelines.
Nigeria is thus a test tube case for Ghana in her quest to regulate the new oil and gas
exploitation industry, and to seek to prevent an environmental disaster from
happening.
Ghana began commercial exploration for oil in the 1950’s with the establishment of
the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), but it was only in 2007 that oil
was found in commercial quantities by Kosmos Energy and their partners, in an area
offshore Ghana’s west Cape Three Points, dubbed the Jubilee Field, in Ghana’s
geophysical Tano basin block. Initial exploration in the East Cape Three Points basin
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encountered non-commercial hydrocarbon shows (Tippee, 1999).

Commercial

exploitation of oil in Ghana began in December 2010.
1.2

Statement of the Problem
“The discovery of oil in Ghana in commercial quantities in 2007 and the
commencement of production in 2010 is expected to have a positive impact on
the economy. On the other hand, the discovery raises a number of crucial and
critical questions regarding the extent to which relevant policies, regulatory and
monitoring mechanisms, and, particularly, environmental measures have been
put in place to effectively respond to any eventual oil disaster” (Otoo, 2012).

The GNPC, in executing its mandate of developing a national petroleum service
industry, and in a bid to derive maximum benefit for the people of Ghana, embarked
on accelerated promotion of the country’s hydrocarbon potential from the mid 1990’s,
with the involvement of international partners, including Tullow Ghana Ltd, Kosmos
Ghana H C, Anadarko W C T P Co, Sabre Oil and Gas, and the E O Group. Tullow
Ghana was designated Unit Operator under a Unitisation and Unit Operating
Agreement with the Ministry of Energy, and the project design and execution was led
by Kosmos Ghana as the Technical Operator (Irvin, de Jong and Armah, 2009). In
2007, the partners found oil in commercial quantities in the West Cape three Points
and Deepwater Tano blocks, and commercial production of Ghana’s oil began in
December 2010. The oil blocks, located 60 km from the nearest coast, was christened
the Jubilee Field (Irvin, de Jong and Armah, 2009). Phase one of the exploitation of
the oil comprised the completion of 17 wells, made up of 9 production wells, 6 water
and 2 gas injection wells to re-inject water and gas back into the reservoir for pressure
maintenance and enhancing oil recovery (Irvin, de Jong and Armah, 2009) (see Fig
1).
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Figure 1: Drill Centre Locations and Associated Flow Lines, Injection Lines and Umbilicals

Due to the fact that the oil is being drilled offshore, any accident which causes a
spillage can have disastrous effects, as evidenced in the Deepwater Horizon incident
in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, and it is imperative that the country guards against
such an occurrence. In fact, upon the commencement of commercial drilling of oil in
Ghana, “just as the events in the Gulf Coast unfolded, reports had it that KOSMOS,
the company exploring oil in Ghana’s Jubilee Field, has spilled 699 barrels of (drill)
mud which contains poisonous heavy metals on three occasions that could affect
Ghana’s ecosystem” (Egbefome, 2011).

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the international body vested with the
mandate of ensuring the safety and security of shipping and preventing marine
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pollution, has adopted various conventions, codes and protocols in executing its
mandate. However, there is no international regulation specifically protecting the
marine environment with regards to exploitation activities, as almost all the
conventions, codes and protocols lay emphasis on maritime transportation. It is thus
left to individual countries to protect their marine environments when it comes to
exploitation of marine resources. With offshore exploitation being so capital intensive,
most oil producing nations in Africa are rather “soft” on such regulations as they do
not have the wherewithal to engage in exploitation themselves, leading to various
pollution incidents with little or no sanctions for the polluting companies, and little
efforts to stem the tide.
In Nigeria, “on May 1, 2010, a raptured Exxon Mobil pipeline in Akwa Ibom state
spilled more than a million gallons into the delta over 7 days before the leak was
stopped. Within days after this spill, thousands of barrels were spilled when the
nearby Shell Trans Niger pipeline was attacked by rebels” (Vidal, 2010). These and
several other spillages in Nigeria have apparently gone under the radar of the
international community with regards to pollution of the environment. “One report
compiled by World Wildlife Federation (WWF) UK, the World Conservation Union and
representatives from the Nigerian federal government and the Nigerian Conservation
Foundation calculated in 2006 that up to 1.5 million tons of oil – 50 times the Exxon
Valdez disaster – has been released into the Niger Delta alone over the past half
century” (Vidal, 2010).
Chad, also an African country, discovered oil in the 1970’s with the Chadian basin
containing a proven reserve of 1 billion barrels of oil, and a potential 5 billion barrels
(Oil & Gas Journal, 2000), but due to political unrest, it was only in the 2000’s that
commercial exploitation began, but they have already began experiencing spillages,
though not on as wide a scale as Nigeria. In 2013, Chad suspended the Chinese
state-run China National Petroleum Corporation, which was prospecting for, as well
as producing oil in Chad, blaming the company for “oil spills in several sites near a
forest” causing “destruction to trees” (BBC, 2013). In 2009, Schwartz and Nodem
report that there was so much environmental damage affecting farmlands and fishing
communities along the 1,080 km Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project since its
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construction from 2000, yet authorities and Exxon, the operators, had done little to
curb the wanton destruction – perhaps due to lack of regulation? (Schwartz and
Nodem, 2009).

These are but a few examples in Western and Central Africa which should send
signals to the Ghanaian authorities to properly put in place measures – including
regulations – to ensure that any looming environmental disaster is first and foremost
guarded against through preventive measures, or where prevention fails, combated
efficiently and in good enough time to prevent massive damage to the environment in
which the exploitation is taking place. Much attention has been paid to the discovery
of the oil and the use to which the revenue generated from its exploitation could be
put, but little attention has been paid to what preventive and combative measures
need to be put in place, by both the drilling companies and the regulatory agencies,
to forestall an environmental disaster. This dissertation therefore seeks to draw
attention to the urgent need for both regulators and operators in Ghana’s oil fields to
put in place regulations and measures to prevent and combat the deleterious effects
of a spillage, should it occur.

1.3

Aims and Objectives

Crude oil is an essential commodity in everyday life, and much can be benefited from
exploitation of crude oil. However, for some countries, the exploitation has caused as
much havoc as it has brought blessing, as it has left the environment damaged and
the populace without their traditional source of livelihood. Ghana’s crude oil find in
commercial quantities came with much euphoria for the citizens, and much is
expected of the government in the utilisation of the revenues to be accrued from its
exploitation.

However, little thought seems to have been given to the potential

disaster looming on the advent of exploitation of crude oil in Ghana’s waters.

This research aims to bring to light the measures that have been put in place to
forestall any environmental disaster after the commencement of exploitation of crude
oil, if any, and to highlight to what extent these measures can, or what measures need
to be put in place, to help prevent or combat such a disaster should it occur. The
research will also proffer some pointers on what measures have been used in other

5

exploitation regimes, and how effective these measures have been, and attempt to
highlight which of these measures may be applicable to the local conditions to reap
the most benefits out of them, and address shortfalls in the measures already in place.
The report will also seek to solicit the help of the local population in putting in place
and implementing such measures, in a bid to ensure protection of the marine
environment and sustainability of the source of livelihood of the people.

1.4

Research Questions

The research will seek to answer the following questions in a bid to help prevent and
combat a spillage during exploitation activities in Ghana’s oil fields:
 Whether Ghana has the legal regime to enforce prevention of environmental
damage due to exploitation activities;
 Whether Ghana has the legal regime to enforce combating of a spillage due
to drilling activities;
 Whether proactive measures are actively in place at the drill sites in order to
prevent a spillage of grave environmental consequences;
 Whether such measures can be effective considering local conditions, and
whether they are in use in other exploitation regimes;
 Whether measures have been put in place to combat a spillage should it occur,
with a view to minimising environmental damage;
 Whether such measures can be effective in minimising environmental
damage;
 Which national provisions have been put in place to engage international help
in the event of a spillage likely to cause grave environmental damage;
 Whether a compensatory regime has been put in place to facilitate securing
international aid in combating a spillage;
 Whether specific onus has been laid on parties responsible for financial
burden in the event of environmental pollution through a spillage;
 Whether the indigenous population have been conscientised on their role in
preventing and combating an environmental disaster should it occur at the oil
fields.
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For the purposes of analysis, these research questions were contracted into the
following criterion, in order to elicit the required information to answer the research
topic:
 Whether Ghana has the legal regime to enforce prevention and/or combating
of environmental damage due to exploitation activities;
 Whether proactive measures are actively in place at the drill sites to prevent
and/or combat a spillage should it occur during exploitation activities;
 Whether national provision had been made to call in international aid in
combating a spillage should it occur;
 Whether a compensatory regime was in place in case of a spillage during
exploitation activities, and whether such regime, if established, places specific
onus and/or sanctions on any party or organisation;
 Whether local conditions and the local population have been factored into any
preventive, combative or compensatory regime in place with regards to a
spillage during exploitation activities.

1.5

Key Assumptions and Limitations of the Study

The major assumption for this study is that Ghana, as an oil producing nation, will
exploit to the fullest extent, the oil reserves found in its Jubilee and Tweneboah, Enyira
and Nntome (TEN) fields, and any other oil finds that may be discovered in the future,
and that this exploitation will be for commercial purposes, and not only to feed the
local oil and gas demands, i.e., it will be exploited for sale, whether refined or in the
crude form, on the world market.

The minor assumption for this study is that all responses to questionnaire and
interviews will be given by respondents and interviewees as dispassionately as
possible, without any bias towards the organisation of the respondent or interviewee,
and these responses are given of the respondents’ and interviewees’ own free will,
without any duress whatsoever.

The major limitation to this study is time constraints, as it had to be undertaken within
a limited time frame, and alongside other academic work which prevented the
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researcher from dedicating his full time to the research work in the initial stages of the
research.

This research would also be limited to actual participants in the extraction of oil and
gas in Ghana’s waters, and to regulators who have a direct bearing on this extraction,
and the protection of Ghana’s marine environment.

Questionnaire would be

administered to senior officials of the Ghana Navy, who are entrusted with protecting
Ghana’s waters, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of Ghana, and the
Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA), as regulatory bodies over Ghana’s marine
environment. Questionnaire would also be administered to senior officials of the
extraction companies, and offshore supply companies servicing the oil and gas
industry. Interviews would be conducted with leaders of local communities directly
affected by the activities in the oil fields. Questionnaire would also be administered
on lecturers at the Regional Maritime University (RMU), which is entrusted with
training local content for the oil and gas industry.

Due to the fact that the industry is a relatively new one in Ghana, there is not much
published text regarding exploitation of oil and gas in Ghana, so the researcher would
depend a lot on publications from other jurisdictions, as well as opinions of industry
experts in Ghana.

Research would be made to ascertain what pertains in other oil producing countries
and juxtapose that against what pertains locally, taking into consideration local
conditions and those international “best practices” which can be adapted to suit local
conditions.

1.6

Organisation of the Research

This research is structured into 4 chapters after an introduction to the research
problem, which gives a background and states the problem actually being researched
on. Chapter 1 is the methodology used in gathering data, and will also give the data
collection procedure, the study area and population sample and the data analysis
procedure.

8

Chapter 2 is a critical review of literature in the area of this study, and examines what
others have posited within the scope of the study, as well as industry standards and
what pertains within the industry with regards to the problem identified in Chapter 1.

Chapter 3 gives the findings from the data gathering and analysis derived from the
data gathered.

Chapter 4 then concludes the research, and proffers recommendations based on the
findings from the research.

1.7
1.7.1

Methodology and Data Collection
Methodology

This research will look at what pertains on the global scene with regards to prevention
and combat of pollution through exploitation activities at the oil fields, and compare
them with what pertains on the local scene, to ascertain the level of local
preparedness with regards to prevention and combat of environmental pollution. The
research will also look at recommended practices and preventive methods and
ascertain to which level same is being implemented. The research will look at what
pertains locally which may not be implemented globally but are ideal for local
conditions to prevent and combat an environmental disaster.

The research data will be gathered using secondary sources for what pertains on the
global scene – in order to have an idea as to what should prevail on the local scene.
This research will then use primary sources – primarily questionnaire and interviews
– to ascertain what pertains on the local scene, in order to compare it with what has
been known to work in other jurisdictions.

1.7.2

Data Collection

Divergent and diverse data was collected in order to put into perspective what pertains
in other jurisdictions where oil exploitation is taking place, and what may be at least
the basic desirable in the local environment of Ghana’s oil and gas exploitation.
Though there is a dearth of international regulation regarding exploitation of oil and
gas and its deleterious effects on the environment, a few international and regional
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agreements seem to have partially covered pollution emanating from other sources,
apart from the transportation of oil, and pollution from exploitation activities can be
covered under these, though not to a great extent.
“As a result of the “Pallas” incident in 1998, Germany set up the Central
Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) (Havariekommando), which is
responsible for monitoring an oil spill and marine pollution response, and for
fire-fighting at sea.

After the Bonn Agreement in 1969, signed 2 years after the Torrey Canyon, in
which Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden and the U K signed the Agreement for cooperation in dealing with
pollution of the North Sea by oil and other harmful substances, there was a
lack of well-coordinated plans for a systematic response to major oil spills, and
the division of responsibilities remained unclear.

It took over a decade, up to 1983 when the European Union and other
European countries acceded to the Agreement for any proactive preparations
to be made towards combat of a spillage, and it was only a few years ago that
the division of responsibilities became clear” (World Ocean Review, 2014, p.
43).

These clearly indicate that in order for a pre-emptive and successful combat of a major
spillage, definite structures and laws/regulations need to be put in place to ensure a
coordinated combating of any pollution which might occur.

The Abidjan Convention for Cooperation in the Protection, Management and
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Atlantic Coast of the
West, Central and Southern Africa Region (Abidjan Convention) and its protocol,
covers cooperation in combating pollution in cases of emergency, spanning a marine
area from Mauritania to South Africa, a coastline of just over 14,000 km, and came
into effect on August 5, 1984. However, how has this Convention been implemented
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with regards to responsibilities of nation states, and has it fared any better than the
Bonn Agreement?

Under the Helsinki Convention which entered into force in 2000, the states bordering
the Baltic Sea, whose waters this Convention seeks to protect, hold an oil spill
response exercise every summer, known as the Balex (Baltic Exercise) in a different
area of the Baltic every year (World Ocean Review, 2014, p. 43).

These agreements, however, at least lay the framework for further collaboration in the
quest to prevent and combat pollution should it occur in the marine environment, be
it accidentally or otherwise, though the concentration is on the transportation of the
oil, and not the actual drilling.
The London Anti-Dumping Convention – The Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 – seeks to “protect the marine
environment from waste due to human activities. It has been in force since 1975, and
seeks to promote effective control of all sources of marine pollution, and to take
practicable steps to prevent pollution of the sea by dumping of wastes and other
matter” (IMO, 2017). In 1996, the London Protocol was agreed to further modernise
the Convention and eventually replace it, and the Protocol prohibited all forms of
dumping, except for possibly acceptable wastes on a so-called “reverse list” (IMO,
2017). The Protocol entered into force in 2006, and spells out prohibitions to dumping
including:
“any deliberate disposal into the sea of wastes or other matter from vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea” (Article 1 (4) (1);
“any abandonment or toppling at site of platforms or other man-made
structures at sea, for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal” (Article 1 (4) (4)
(IMO, 2017).

These two provisions appear to look at decommissioning of wells, and not specifically
pollution occurring as a result of actual operations of oil wells. The Convention and
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Protocol therefore only places onus on the operators to prevent actual dumping at
sea during their operations.

Apart from these few regional agreements, there is a lack of international regulation
when it comes to regulating oil exploitation regimes, especially when compared to
regulations regarding the transport of oil. This lack of international regulation is
highlighted in the case of developing countries, which, in addition to addressing the
economic and governmental challenges that an oil boom brings, also have to contend
with the environmental risks and challenges (Moreno, 2009).
“Regions made up of developing countries often do not have the resources
and governmental structures required to create and manage a legal
framework for the prevention of environmental harm from offshore oil and gas
exploration and production activities. This particular scenario is unfolding in
the Gulf of Guinea. The countries in the Gulf of Guinea, in an area in the West
and Central African coast, are either currently producing offshore or are
exploring for offshore oil.

However, the region currently lacks a

comprehensive environmental protection plan to address offshore oil and gas
exploration and production” (Moreno, 2009, pp. 421 – 422).

This calls into sharp focus the need to streamline regulations for the industry, as well
as put in place measures and cooperative efforts to combat a spillage should it occur,
perhaps along the lines of the Balex and the Bonn Agreement.

1.7.3

Study Area

Data collected for this study will primarily be restricted to the waters offshore Ghana,
in the West African sub-region.

Specifically, data will be collected on offshore

exploitation activities in Ghana’s oil fields offshore Cape Three Points. Though some
data would be collected from governmental and regulatory agencies based in Accra,
the capital of Ghana, the data would be specific to activities in the oil fields, in the
Western Region of Ghana. The immediate environs of the exploitation activities are
the waters at Ghana’s Cape Three Points, with notable towns being, Princess Town,
Miamia and Dixcove. Cape Three Points itself is a small village at the southernmost
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tip of Ghana – though activities since the oil find may soon turn it into a booming oil
town, or at least a sizeable settlement. The inhabitants of these towns are mostly
fisher folk, engaged in fishing and fish processing (primarily smoking and drying).

1.7.4

Population Sample

Due to the very nature of the data needed for this research, it would have been
impracticable to use a large population sample for the research. The sample was
therefore restricted to actual participants in the oil exploitation, vis-à-vis the
exploitation companies, as well as governmental institutions and agencies involved
or likely to be involved in prevention and combat of a spillage should one occur at the
exploitation site, and some service providers to the operators at the oil fields. The
sample size was therefore restricted to the following organisations:
 The Exploitation Companies
 The Ghana Navy
 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
 The Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA)
 The Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
 The Regional Maritime University (RMU)
 The local population.

Apart from the RMU and the local population, all other organisations would be
involved in the prevention and the combat of oil pollution at the oil fields. The RMU,
which is the premier institution for training local content for the oil fields, were included
because their training would contribute towards prevention of pollution, since some of
their trainees would ultimately be involved in the oil fields. The local population was
included because activities at the oil fields directly impact on them, and their fishing
activities would also impact directly on the operations at the oil fields, therefore they
would also be instrumental in the prevention of a disaster at the oil fields – even if only
by their absence at the oil fields, which was their traditional fishing grounds.

Respondents from the organisations were from the rank of Deputy Director and above
for the governmental agencies, and Lieutenant Commander and above for the Navy,
due to the sensitive nature of the information needed. For the exploitation companies,
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respondents were the Drill Environmental Health & Safety Supervisors (Drill EHS
Supervisors) of the respondent companies. Random sampling was made with the
local population, which samples included the Assembly Members of each area and
chief fishermen of each town/village, as well as some leaders amongst the
fishmongers.

1.7.5

Data Collection Methods

Questionnaire were mainly used to collect data for this research, and were
administered on the selected respondents. The questionnaire were organisationspecific, to elicit exact data on what each selected organisation’s role was in the
prevention and combat of a spillage at the oil fields. Structured interviews were
conducted for the local residents, largely due to their level of education, and also in
order to have an organised response. An interview was also conducted with the GMA,
though based on the same lines as the questionnaire for that organisation.

Secondary data from publications, Conventions and Laws were also used to set the
backdrop for determining best practices and regulations regarding protecting the
marine environment from pollution due to the exploitation activities, and combating of
an oil spill to prevent further environmental damage to the environment. Data was
sourced from the IMO, international journals and established organisations in the oil
and gas exploration and exploitation fields, as well as reputable sites on the internet,
and published books and articles on the subject.

1.7.6

Data Analysis

Qualitative analysis was used in the analysis of the data, as this was considered the
best type of analysis to achieve the desired result, in order to highlight any shortfalls
or potential shortfalls in the prevention and combat of an oil spill in Ghana’s waters
during the exploitation of oil. Emphasis could then be placed on what measures
needed to be implemented by the various organisations engaged in Ghana’s oil and
gas industry at all times. Similar but organisation specific questions were asked of
the selected organisations to elicit information to answer the Research Questions.
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CHAPTER 2

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Commercial Oil and Gas Drilling in Ghana

Ghana struck oil and gas in commercial quantities in 2007, and commercial drilling
begun in 2010. Oil is a potential pollutant of the environment, so it is important to put
in place measures to forestall and combat a spill, if one should occur, which cannot
be ruled out in any environment where commercial exploitation takes place, due to
the potential harm it will cause the environment if left unchecked.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 1982), in
Article 1 (4), has defines pollution of the marine environment as
“The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human
health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing, and other legitimate uses
of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities”.
(IMO, 1982, p 2).

Exploitation for oil and gas have been on-going for over a century under various
regimes, both on-shore and off-shore. For on-shore exploitation, to a large extent, it
is possible to control the potential of a spillage such that it does not cause much
damage to the environment.

In the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia, Jordan,

Yemen, Sudan and Libya, as well as in Siberia in Russia, much damage has not been
caused to the environment because most of the exploitation is on-shore, and apart
from the activities of saboteurs, as in the case of Sudan and Nigeria, it is relatively
easy to control oil spills. However, when left uncontrolled, grave damage can be
caused to the environment in which it is spilled. In May 2010, an ExxonMobil pipeline
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in the Niger Delta in Nigeria was ruptured, and reportedly spilled more than a million
gallons of oil into the delta over a week before the leak was stopped (Vidal, 2010).

As noted in the World Ocean Review, 2014,
“Offshore gas and oil production began more than a century ago. With many
shallow-water fields already exhausted, these natural resources are now
being extracted at ever greater depths. Production rates are higher than ever,
while oil pollution is decreasing. However, this (decrease) is largely due to the
stringent regulations applicable to shipping: the explosion at the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig clearly demonstrated that safety is a long-neglected issue in the
oil (extraction) industry” (World Ocean Review, 2014).

Some control measures used to combat oil spills on-shore have been to cap wells
and replace pipelines. In Nigeria, much of the spillages on-shore (in the Niger Delta
area) has been caused by sabotage or old and leaky pipelines. Thus, for on-shore
drilling, prompt and efficient measures put in place to combat spills have been largely
effective.

It is much more difficult to control oil spills that occur offshore. Arguably, many of the
world’s oil exploitation regimes take place offshore – the Falklands in the United
Kingdom, the Atlantic Ocean in the United States and Canada, the Arctic Ocean and
the Atlantic Ocean off the Coast of Africa. What pose a difficulty in the management
of oil spills offshore are the elements. Offshore, nature is much more difficult to
harness, and the actions of the tides and waves, as well as wind and current actions
carry any spillage to great distances, thus making its control more difficult and causing
more pollution than on-shore spillages. The situation gets worse when the spillage is
accidental and comes directly from the source of the oil, as in a blow-out.

The need to guard against spillages at exploitation sites cannot be over-emphasised:
the Ixtoc I spilled about 475,000 tonnes of oil, the Deepwater Horizon spilled over
700,000 tonnes of oil before they could be brought under control. Both these spills
far outweigh spills from ships: the Atlantic Express spilled 287,000 tonnes, the ABT
Summer spilled 260,000 tonnes, the Castillo de Bellver spilled 252,000 tonnes, the
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Amoco Cadiz spilled 223,000 tonnes, the Haven spilled 144,000 tonnes, the Odyssey
spilled 132,000 tonnes, the Torrey Canyon spilled 119,000 tonnes, the Sea Star
spilled 115,000 tonnes, the Prestige spilled 63,000 tonnes, the Exxon Valdez spilled
37,000 tonnes (World Ocean Review, 2014).

It can be seen that though spillages from ships have been the catalysts for
Conventions to be adopted, spillages at exploitation sites are far more devastating to
the marine environment in terms of quantities spilled. The necessity to address
spillages from exploitation sites is highlighted when one considers the fact that “there
are currently around 900 large-scale oil and gas platforms around the world” (World
Ocean Review, 2014).

To ensure that the marine environment is not unduly polluted and to hasten response
to pollution due to oil spillage, the United Nations (UN) and the IMO have adopted
various Conventions and Protocols to protect the marine environment by prescribing
ways to prevent and combat spills that do occur. However, these conventions, though
seemingly adequate in addressing pollution arising from the transportation of oil in
various modes, have been woefully inadequate in the area of actual exploitation
activities.

The Ghana Shipping Act 2003, (Act 645), was passed to enhance the development
of merchant shipping in the country, but failed to cover issues relating to marine
pollution, oil pollution liability and compensation regimes, though these aspects are
covered in international conventions which Ghana is party to.

Relevant laws with regard to marine pollution in Ghana, before the commencement
of commercial exploitation of oil and gas, were the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964,
the Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994, and the Ghana Maritime Security Act
in 2004. These laws, however, were deficient in prescribing legislation to regulate
exploitation activities in Ghana’s waters which may lead to pollution.

The Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) was established under Act 630 of 2002 and
charged with the responsibility of monitoring, regulating and coordinating activities in
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the maritime industry. As part of its mandate, it has the duty to ensure in collaboration
with such other public agencies and institutions as the Board may determine the
prevention of marine source pollution, protection of the marine environment and
response to marine environment incidents. Due to the paucity of legislation to regulate
the marine environment with regards to oil and gas exploration and exploitation, the
GMA in October 2010, presented to Parliament the Marine Pollution Bill, amendments
to the Ghana Maritime Authority Act and the Ghana Maritime Security Act, and other
legislations

to

regulate

the

oil

and

(http://www.ghanamaritime.org/ind.php?news=1&pndet=23).

gas

industry

This paper looks at

how adequately or efficiently Ghana’s laws, as well as the established practices and
procedures of organisations engaged in Ghana’s oil and gas industry, can prevent
and/or combat an environmental damage due to spillage at the actual drill site, and
not just in the transportation of the oil.

2.2

What is a Blow Out?

The Illustrated Petroleum Reference Dictionary defines a blowout as an “Out of control
gas and/or oil pressure erupting from a well being drilled; a dangerous uncontrolled
eruption of gas and oil from a well; a wild well” (Langenkamp, 1985). An A-Z of
Offshore Oil & Gas also defines a blowout as “A sudden, violent, uncontrolled escape
of gas/water/oil, with mud, at high pressure from a well” (Whitehead, 1983), and goes
on to explain that
“blowouts occur when the formation pressure exceeds the hydrostatic head of
the drilling fluid, and have caused extensive damage to, and even loss of,
drilling rigs and equipment. They are also dangerous to life, and at best cause
costly delays in the drilling programme” (Whitehead, 1983).
The Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary defines a blowout as an “uncontrolled flow of
formation fluids from a well, the wellbore or into lower pressurized subsurface zones
(underground blowout)” (Schlumberger, 2017).

From the above definitions, blowouts are accidental and uncontrollable, in a controlled
(pressurized) environment, and usually cause much damage to the environment into
which the effects of the blowout is released. This is because due to the accidental

18

nature of the occurrence, a blowout is difficult to bring under control immediately, and
would usually spill a lot of the contents of the well before it is brought under control.
The Santa Barbara oil spill caused by a blowout on Platform A of Union Oil spilled an
estimated 3 million gallons of oil before it was brought under control (Clarke and
Hemphil, 2001). For the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, also the result of a blowout, an
estimated 3.19 million barrels of oil was spilled before the well was finally successfully
capped (Ocean Portal, 2017). Many drilling wells now have blowout preventers
(BOPs) which are specialized valves to prevent blowouts, or at least give an early
enough signal for measures to be taken to prevent blowouts.

Blowouts are different from blow-ups in that blowouts occur during actual drilling
operations on the well or pipe, whilst blow-ups occur during transportation of the
product by vessel or pipeline, either accidentally, usually caused by fire or a ruptured
pipeline, or by controlled explosions to sink a stricken vessel.

2.3

What Causes Blowouts?

The enormous pressure of the rock formations around an oil reservoir is the
underlying cause of blowouts (Petro Industry News, 2014).

Oil naturally occurs over a period of millions of years, during which all of the
water is compressed and pressurised out of the carbon-based substance
(normally life-forms of one type or another) by the layers of sediment that form
on top of it. When drilling, this pressure is counteracted by the use of mud
around the drilling site, which helps to balance the hydrostatic pressure. If this
balance is upset, water, gas or oil can infiltrate the wellbore or even the drill
itself – a phenomenon known as a “kick” – and this can quickly escalate into
a blowout if not promptly identified and addressed. (Petro Industry News,
2014)
The use of the wrong set of ‘rams’ to shut in the well can also be a catalyst for blowouts
(northdakotaoillawyers.com, 2013). In drilling oil and gas, various means are used to
prevent the escape of same into the environment, a major one of which is a Blow Out
Preventer (BOP).
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The BOP stack usually consists of two sets of Rams and one “annular”
preventer. The stack consists of “pipe rams” which are the main means of
preventing hydrocarbons from escaping, ‘blind” rams which are used when no
drill pipe is in the hole and completely shuts in the well, and “shear” rams which
cut away the heavy drill pipe and completely shut in the well. Blowouts can
be caused by the use of the wrong set of rams to shut in the well. There are
times the pipe rams are not effective to shut in the well, but are used by the
drill crew because they mainly train with pipe rams. Blowouts, explosions and
serious injuries occur when the BOP’s are closed and the well is supposed to
be shut-in. Unfortunately, down hole pressures can exceed the rated pressure
of the BOPs. In addition, the BOPs have to be activated to shut-in the well.
(North Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013)

Migration of oil or gas into the drill well or hole may also cause blowouts (North Dakota
Oil Lawyers, 2013).
“Trip tanks” are used to measure the amount of drilling mud that is being
returned to the surface. If mud volume is increasing at too fast a rate, it is an
indication that a blowout may be about to occur. The increased volume of mud
means that gas or oil is migrating into the hole, and the well may be about to
blow out. When the well is being drilled and the crew is tripping in or out of
the hole, mud volume is lost. If that mud is not replaced the down-hole
pressure may overcome the mud weight, and a blowout can occur. (North
Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013)

Risking controlling the hydrocarbons that enter the drill well or hole without adequate
precautions also cause blowouts (North Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013).
By far, the most common cause of blowouts is drilling “underbalanced” – taking
the risks of controlling the hydrocarbons that enter the hole by circulating them
out while drilling. Safe drilling practices require the mud to be “weighted” up to
hold back the pressure, but operators get in a hurry to produce the well, and
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time is money, so they drill underbalanced and lose control of the well. (North
Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013)

The above indicates that the causes of blowouts are all human-induced. The natural
setting of the oil itself makes extraction difficult, therefore extra caution and skill needs
to be applied in its extraction. However, due to the expensive nature of oil exploitation,
companies and individuals may want to avoid as much cost as possible, and thus pay
less attention to safety details as they should, giving rise to many of the blowouts
which have occurred world-wide. “In its final report, published in December 2011, a
US Committee of experts concluded that a series of technical failures and flawed
decisions led to the disaster of the Deepwater Horizon” (World Ocean Review, 2014).
This is what the oil industry needs to guard against.
2.4

Types of Blowouts

There are three main types of blowouts identified over the years (Petro Industry News,
2014):
 Surface Blowouts: During a surface blowout, the drill string is ejected out of
the well, and the force with which the oil or gas escapes from the well may
cause damage to the drilling rig, with a fire being the most dangerous and
costly. These are the most common types of blowouts, and risk damaging the
surrounding terrain in addition to the rig itself (Petro Industry News, 2014).
 Underground Blowouts: These are situations where oil or gas escape from a
well in high pressure area to a low pressure area (Schlumberger, 2017). This
type of blowout may not cause serious damage to the environment
immediately, as the flow does not escape above ground. However, it might
have effects on other wells in the area due to the change in pressure.
 Underwater Blowouts: These occur under water (sub-sea), mainly due to
equipment failure, and are the most difficult to deal with (petro-online, 2013).
They are situations where oil or gas escape from the well into the sea, and
have the most deleterious effects on the marine environment. They are the
most difficult to deal with, and may persist for the longest time. The biggest
and deepest underwater blowout in history is that of the Deepwater Horizon in
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (Petro Industry News, 2013).
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2.5

Some Deleterious Effects of Blowouts

Oil spills are very harmful to the environment within which the oil is spilt, in that “the
damage caused by such spills is permanent and takes a long time to clean up”
(Conserve Energy Future, 2017). Being a hydrocarbon compacted and accumulated
over millions of years, oil does not easily mix with the environment within which it is
spilled. If oil is spilled on land, it negatively affects the soil in which it is spilled, and
renders farmlands and other agricultural lands unusable for those purposes. Oil
spilled on land also seeps into rivers and other water bodies and contaminates them
such that they can no longer be treated for use by humans, or at the very best,
treatment of such water bodies for human consumption becomes very expensive, as
the oil contains cancer-causing compounds such as benzene.

The Mingubalak Oil Spill, also known as the Fergana Valley Oil Spill, was
caused by a blowout on Well No. 5 in the Mingubalak Oil Field, Fergana Valley,
Uzbekistan, on March 2, 1992, and is widely known as the largest accidental
terrestrial oil spill (after the intentional burning of Kuwaiti oil fields during the
Gulf War). An estimated 285,000 tons (about 88 million gallons) of oil was
lost, released into the environment. There was no clean up, and the oil seeped
into the ground, and totally destroyed the agricultural sector of the economy.
It had a negative effect on wildlife as well, birds were covered with oil which
was so heavy it made them unable to fly (Mikucki, 2013).
In November 2016, “Britain’s High Court began hearing lawsuits filed by the Ogale
and Bille people of Nigeria against Shell, alleging that decades of oil spills have fouled
the water and destroyed the lives of thousands of fishermen and farmers in the Niger
River Delta, where a Shell subsidiary has operated since the 1950’s” (Al Jazeera,
2016). Local communities in Nigeria have been fighting the Oil majors for decades
for compensation, due to the deleterious effects of oil spillages into their lands and
water bodies, destroying their means of livelihood. Cleaning up spillages on land can
take up to a quarter of a century, and is very costly in terms of financial resources and
time, and it is yet to be made known how long the soil would take to replenish its
fertility (Mustoe, 2016).
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Figure 2: Water bodies and farmlands in Nigeria polluted by oil
Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/shell-sued-uk-decades-oil-spills-nigeria161122193545741.html

Some residents have claimed that drinking the contaminated water from the rivers
and water bodies is “causing strange diseases in the communities, skin diseases,
sudden deaths, impotence and low sperm counts (Al Jazeera, 2017).

When oil is spilled into the oceans, it has no less deleterious effects. Marine and
aquatic life suffocate because the oil prevents fishes from getting oxygen in the water,
killing millions of them and may even threaten some species. Plankton and other
aquatic species also die off, hampering the development and growth of fishes and
other marine life, which depend on plankton for survival.

Figure 3: View of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill taken from above in June, 2010
Source: http://ocean.si.edu/ocean-photos/oil-spill-above
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Marine mammals and aquatic birds such as seagulls and pelicans also feel the
negative effects of the spills – their feathers get all oiled up and renders them unable
to fly, they do not get enough to eat, and the little they get to eat are contaminated,
thus posing a danger to their health as well.

Figure 4: An oiled seabird was found dead on the beach at Alaska, November 1997. (NOAA)
Source: http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/oil-spills/how-oil-harms-animals-andplants-marine-environments.html

The effect of a spillage on the economy of a community is also negative, in that it
renders beaches unusable for recreational activities, mostly because the waters are
unusable for recreational activities, as well as the unpleasant odour coming from the
dead fishes and other mammals at the contaminated areas. In Ghana, a spillage of
mud in 2010 caused the communities to be unable to fish for some weeks because of
the contamination (Bedgley, 2012).

Therefore, from a myriad of angles, oil spills caused by blowouts or other activities
related to extraction of the oil have negative effects on the environment and
inhabitants, with very little positive effects.

2.6

How Can Spillage Due To Blowouts Be Prevented

The most common method of preventing blowouts is the use of Blow Out Preventers
(BOP) on the well during drilling. BOPs are high pressure wellhead valves designed
to shut off the uncontrolled flow of hydro-carbons (COGIS, 2017). The Illustrated
Petroleum Reference Dictionary also defines a BOP as “A stack or an assembly of
heavy-duty valves attached to the top of the casing to control well pressure”
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(Langenkamp, 1985). There are several types of BOPs like single ram and double
ram preventers. They are mostly monitoring devises on the drill well to monitor the
ingress and egress of water and mud from the well and sound an alarm when the rate
of ingress or egress exceeds the set rate.

Figure 5: Image of Ocean Drill BOP being deployed

Source: http://www.drilltech.cn/info/Ocean-drilling-BOP-137-1.htm

The BOPs are used to give advance warning of an impending blowout, to enable
preventive or corrective action to be taken before it reaches the critical pressure point
when the blowout will occur. At all times, a critical monitoring of the BOP would be
the best means of preventing a blowout.
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Being able to recognise underground blowouts is also a major pointer to an impending
blowout, and immediate corrective action can prevent the underground blowout from
escalating into a surface blowout. Due to its very nature, underground blowouts can
be difficult to recognise, therefore experience in drilling wells is key in recognising
such types of blowouts, in order to take corrective action to prevent it developing into
a surface blowout.

Well capping has also been used to prevent blowouts. However, this may only be
effective at the early stages of a blowout, if the pressure mounts to a certain degree,
capping the well may be too late to prevent a blowout. In the Deepwater Horizon
incident in the Gulf of Mexico, initial attempts at capping the affected well did not yield
the desired results because the blowout had degenerated to such an extent that
capping the well alone could not prevent it. The well was only successfully capped
after 87 days, having released an estimated 3.19 million barrels (Ocean Portal, 2017)
to 4.9 million barrels (Ebinger, 2016) of oil into the ocean.
From the Deepwater Horizon blowout “which raised questions about the safety of
deep water drilling, the adequacy of the corporate response to the disaster and of
governmental regulation of offshore drilling” (Allin, 2016), lessons can be learnt on
preventive measures to be taken in order to prevent blowouts. The lessons learnt
point to vigilance in monitoring, and the need to use and maintain proper equipment
in order to prevent equipment failure and forestall a blowout. The New Scientist lists
8 failures that caused the Gulf Oil Spill:
 Dodgy cement used at the bottom of the borehole, which did not create a seal;
 Valve failure at the bottom of the pipe which were designed to stop the flow of
oil and gas but failed;
 Misinterpretation of pressure tests by the crew;
 Not spotting the leak soon enough;
 Valve no. 2 failure in the blowout preventer;
 An overwhelmed separator which was not designed for the quantity of oil and
gas as well as drill mud which were diverted into it;
 Failure of the on-board gas alarm; and
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 A flat battery which should have enabled the BOP to kick in automatically once
control through the main lines were lost due to the explosion (New Scientist,
2010).

Careful attention paid to these pointers can help prevent future blowouts on other rigs.

2.7

Where Have Spillage Due To Blowouts Been Known To Occur

The Deepwater Horizon blowout is the one which wreaked the most havoc in US
waters, and arguably the largest accidental oil spill in history, spilling an estimated 5
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico (Allin, 2016). It was caused by a blowout
on the exploratory Macondo 252 well “as the drill hole had been – or was being –
cemented to seal the well so that the drill pipe could be removed and the Deepwater
Horizon could be moved to a new location” (Allin, 2016). The Deepwater Horizon was
drilling oil in the Gulf of Mexico, which oil was located 3.5 km below the sea floor and
7 km below the drilling platform (Allin, 2016). The immediate cause of the blowout
was the failure of the cement used to seal the well, and the failure of the BOP, which
was designed to cut through the drill casing and seal the well in case of an emergency
(Allin, 2016).

Quite recently, in 2015, an oil well owned by Oasis Petroleum Inc. experienced a
blowout and was out of control for nearly three days, spilling more than 1,667 barrels
of crude oil and 2,000 barrels of brine (Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 2015).

The Ixtoc I exploratory well blew out on June 3, 1979 in the Bay of Campeche in
Mexico, and by the time it was brought under control, had spilled an estimated 140
million gallons into the Bay (Congressional Digest, 2010). This blowout has also been
recorded as one of the worst oil spills in history.

The Mingubalak Oil Spill, also known as the Fergana Valley Oil Spill, was caused by
a blowout on Well No. 5 in the Mingubalak Oil Field, Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan, on
March 2, 1992, and is widely known as the largest accidental terrestrial oil spill.
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From the foregone, there can be no gainsaying the fact that blowouts which have
occurred in history have had very damaging environmental effects on the ecology into
which the oil has been spilled. It is also evident that blowouts, due to their very nature,
are difficult to bring under control, thus their propensity to spill a lot and cause much
environmental damage before they are brought under control – or empty the contents
of the well on which the blowout occurred.
2.8

How Can Spillage Due To Blowouts Be Controlled

Due to the very nature of blowouts, they cannot be controlled once they occur. The
effects of the blowout is to leave an oil well gushing out its contents into the
environment, and the only way any form of control can be implemented to curb greater
environmental damage is to cap the wellhead – i.e., seal the well which is gushing out
the oil. Unless and until the wellhead is capped, the effects of the blowout cannot be
controlled, since the oil gushing out is coming from a pressurised region into a less
pressurised one. To cap a wellhead, cement is usually used in varying degrees, and
if the well has experienced a blowout, it is normal to cap the wellhead permanently,
using blocks of cement which can weigh up to 5,000 tons. Wells which experience
blowouts are not usually used again, but subsidiary wells are drilled if the same
reserve is to be exploited again.

2.9

Does The Real Possibility of a Spillage Due To Blowout in Ghana’s
Waters Exist?

Development and production of Ghana’s oil and gas in commercial quantities is a long
term activity, spanning 15 – 25 years for the Jubilee Field along, with longer time span
for the TEN (Tweneboah, Enyira and Ntomme) Fields, which contain larger reserves
(GNPC, 2016). Thus, a Development Plan has been crafted out which ensures that
the development and production will be done in such a way as to have minimum
adverse impact on the environment (GNPC, 2016). The Plan covers all phases from
Development through Production to Abandonment. A third Field, the Sankofa GyeNyame Field, has also been discovered, and exploratory works are currently on-going
on this field. Commercial exploitation of the Jubilee Field started in 2010, and that of
the TEN Fields started in 2016 for Oil, and 2017 for Natural Gas. The TEN fields are
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estimated to have in excess of 300 million barrels of oil and 360 billion cubic feet of
gas – this field holds Ghana’s major gas reserves (GNPC, 2016).

With the production of oil and natural gas projected into 2033 and beyond (GNPC,
2016), it is evident that the real possibility of a blowout exists in Ghana’s oil and gas
exploitation activities. This is buttressed by the fact that the Jubilee Field is located
60 nautical miles offshore, and the TEN and Sankofa Gye-Nyame Fields extend even
further, creating the environment for a blowout if extra care and attention is not paid
to exploitation activities.

Again, blowouts are accidental occurrences and need to be adequately guarded
against, but with oil exploitation taking place in a pressurised environment, especially
offshore, blowouts are a real possibility in Ghana’s oil and gas industry.

2.10 How Can Pollution From Blowouts Be Combated
The most basic and urgent demand resulting from a spillage due to blowout is to
identify the source of the blowout and take immediate measures to prevent or reduce
further spillage. Initial reports of the spillage must be reported to the appropriate
authority and a contingency plan immediately activated to prevent major damage to
the environment.

An Oil Spill Contingency Plan is a requirement in all incidents of oil spills, and the IMO
has published a Manual on Oil Pollution – Contingency Planning, which “provides
guidance to governments, particularly those of developing countries, on ways and
means of establishing a response organisation and preparing contingency plans” for
oil spillages (IMO, 1995). The Contingency Plan adopted “takes into account the
OPRC, 1990”, and also has a section on Combating Oil Spills, published separately
from the Contingency Plan. Ghana factored the tenets of the Manual into the Maritime
Pollution Act, 2016, which prescribes setting up a National Coordinator to prepare a
National Contingency Plan for preparedness and response in cases of oil spills.
In combating the oil spill, and as part of the information to be provided by those at the
source of the spill, the “type of oil together with an estimate of the quantity spilled”
should be disclosed (IMO, 2005, p 41). This information would be necessary to
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determine the type of combating to be used to manage the spillage. Spilled oil is
normally “carried by the currents and blown by the wind, so immediate measures
should be taken to combat the spill to minimise pollution damage to the marine
environment” (IMO, 2005, p 51).
One option in combating a spill is to use “containment booms to localise the spillage
and prevent the oil from further drifting as skimming devices are used to recover the
oil from the sea surface” (IMO, 2005, p 51). Alternatively, other methods such as
positioning booms in places where floating oil will naturally collect, either in open
waters or more commonly close to shore, ready for recovery using skimmers and
pumps (IMO, 2005, p 51). These methods demand that containment booms be
readily or easily available at the site of the spillage – i.e., at the drilling site, in order
to be immediately deployed to forestall grave environmental damage, and may only
be effective for relatively minor spillages. However, for spillages due to blowouts, this
method may be inadequate, unless the wellhead can be immediately capped to
forestall a major spill.
Spillages from blowouts can also be combated using chemical dispersants. “Wave
action and turbulence due to tides and currents causes some of the oil to break down
into small droplets which can be carried down into the water column, a process known
as dispersion.

This process can be enhanced by the application of chemical

dispersants” (IMO, 2005, p 101). Dispersants are chemical agents that alter the
physical behaviour and properties of oil on the sea surface, thereby enabling
penetration of the dispersant into the oil and increasing the rate of droplet formation
and assimilation of the oil into the water column.
Dispersants can be used to combat oil spillages from blowouts – and in fact, were
used in the cases of the Ixtoc I and Deepwater Horizon. However, in deciding to use
chemical dispersants, environmental issues should be taken into consideration,
especially the effect that dispersants would have on marine life. This is because the
dispersants themselves are potentially damaging to the marine environment, and they
don’t get rid of the oil but rather breaks the oil down for it to assimilate into the water
column, thereby still maintaining, albeit to a lesser degree, the pollution the oil will
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cause to the marine environment. Dispersants may be applied or sprayed from
shipboard sources or from light aircraft, and therefore the decision to use dispersants
would entail having available or easily available the logistics to deploy them in the
event of a spillage.

Another method of combating a spillage is in situ burning, i.e., the intentional burning
of the oil on the surface of the water – this method was also initially tried during the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Under ideal conditions, this can be an effective way of
removing large quantities of oil in a relatively short period of time (IMO, 2005, p 119).
In the Deepwater Horizon case, incendiary bombs were initially used to try to set the
oil ablaze. However, for in situ burning to be completely successful, the oil needs to
be thick – an ideal situation in the event of a spillage due to blowouts – and the
thickness maintained during the burning. In actual burning of oil on water surface, as
the oil burns, the thickness reduces, and therefore the fire point of the oil, thereby
naturally pushing the fire to a natural death. In order to ensure that all the oil is burned,
there is the need to maintain the thickness through containment, so the oil can all burn
off the surface of the sea. This containment is done through the use of fire-resistant
containment booms.

Again, before in situ burning can be utilised, consideration must be given to its effects,
i.e., the thick black plume of smoke it will generate, and the residues of materials that
remain after the burning has stopped (IMO, 2005, pp 121 – 122). Another initial issue
before in situ burning can be considered is that the fire does not flash back to the
source of the oil – e.g., the wellhead, which will create an even bigger explosion and
catapult the spillage out of control.

For spillages on land, washing or flushing using high pressure hot water (as is used
in tank cleaning on oil tankers) can also be used to combat the effects of the spillage.
However, this method may also only be useful in the case of small spillages, and may
be ineffective to combat the effects of a blowout.
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2.11 Current Situation In Terms of Legislation
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 defines
pollution of the marine environment in Article 1(4) as
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality of use of sea water and
reduction of amenities (IMO, 1982)

Article 145 of the same UNCLOS also requires that necessary measures be taken to
protect the marine environment with respect to pollution from exploration and
exploitation activities in the “Area”, which is “the seabed and ocean floor and sub soil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” according to Article 1(1) (UNCLOS,
1982). Article 192 of UNCLOS states that “states have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment” (UNCLOS, 1982). Article 194(1) requires states to
“individually or jointly, as appropriate, take all measures consistent with the
Convention as are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best
practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities,
and to harmonise their policies in this connection” (IMO, 1982).

Article 194 (3) (c) particularly states that measures taken pursuant to dealing with all
sources of pollution of the marine environment shall be designed to minimise to the
fullest extent possible
“pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of
the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of
operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment,
operation and manning of such installations or devices” (IMO, 1982).
Article 195 requires that states, “in taking measures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment, shall act so as not to transfer, directly or
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indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another, or transfer one type of
pollution into another” (IMO, 1982).

Articles 207 and 210 relate particularly to the activities states should take in order to
prevent pollution, either from land based sources or from seabed activities, and
activities in the area, as well as from dumping, which will harm the marine
environment.
In the 1950’s, the world was not yet overly concerned with major oil spills. The
precursor of marine pollution prevention conventions was the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL 1954),
which mainly dealt with operational discharges from ships (Kuokkanen, Couzens,
Honkonen and Lewis, 2016). The OILPOL 1954 was the first well set out international
convention on marine pollution, which Ghana ratified and gave effect to by virtue of
the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, Act 235 (Mbiah, 2009). The OILPOL 1954
convention was mainly to deal with ship source pollution, mostly from normal
operational discharges, as ships usually just discharged their oily wastes into the
oceans at the time of the passage of the OILPOL 1954. The OILPOL 1954 was,
however, soon overtaken by events and other developments in the maritime transport
industry, and though it went through various amendments and updates in 1962, 1969
and 1971, it was woefully inadequate to address the new challenges in protecting the
marine environment from pollution by oil.
The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) – the precursor
to the IMO – Conference in 1969 therefore adopted the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC 1969), which brought bout
significant changes to the OILPOL 1954 regime (Mbiah, 2009). In 1969, the IMCO
Conference completed the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969 (Intervention Convention 1969),
which entered into force on May 6, 1975. However, in the 1970’s, environmental
concerns were so heightened that it became evident that the CLC 1969 compensation
limits were inadequate to meet serious marine pollution incidents. Due to these
concern raised, the IMCO developed a supplementary regime to the CLC 1969, the
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International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (FUND 1971), which entered into force
on October 16, 1978, and has also been ratified by Ghana (Mbiah, 2009).

However, the CLC 1969 and the FUND 1971 were still not adequate enough to
address all the concerns of the international community with regards to the
environment. This then led to the development of the most comprehensive instrument
to date, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which was designed to supersede the OILPOL 1954, and entered
into force on October 2, 1983. Ghana has incorporated the relevant provisions of the
MARPOL 73/78 into the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 and also the Ghana Shipping
Act, 2003 (Act 645) (Mbiah, 2009).

Ghana has also ratified other International

Conventions on protection of the marine environment from pollution, including the
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation
(OPRC) 1990, which Ghana ratified in 2010 and has incorporated into its laws,
including the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016.

Arguably, these appear to be the main international law provisions towards the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment through exploitation activities, and
their coverage of the subject matter leaves much to be desired.

The IMO has other conventions that seek to prevent the pollution of the marine
environment due to transportation activities, most notably the MARPOL 73/78, and
the HNS Convention, as well as activities relating to maritime transport, notably the
Ballast Water Convention and the Anti-Dumping Convention, but there is no
international convention relating purely to pollution of the environment through
exploitation activities.

However, the dearth of international conventions and

regulations with regards to pollution due to exploration and exploitation activities
should not lead to rampant pollution of the environment due to these activities. It is
the responsibility of nation states to enact and implement regulations which will
prevent and combat pollution in the marine environment due to exploration and
exploitation activities.
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The MARPOL 73/78, the main IMO Convention relating to marine pollution by oil, in
Article 1, enjoins states parties to “undertake to give effect to the Convention and
Annexes, on order to prevent the pollution of the marine environment by the discharge
of harmful substances or effluences containing such substances in contravention of
the Convention” (MARPOL 73/78). In relation to pollution through exploration and
exploitation activities, however, Article 3 (ii) expressly stipulates that ‘Discharge does
not include release of harmful substances directly arising from the exploration,
exploitation and associated offshore processing of seabed mineral resources”
(MARPOL 73/78).

The MARPOL is thus specifically geared towards the

transportation of substances that can potentially harm the marine environment, and
not necessarily the exploration and exploitation of such substances.
2.12 Specific Legislation Protecting the Marine Environment
Ghana’s closest neighbour in English-speaking West Africa, Nigeria, has been drilling
oil for over half a decade, since its first export in 1960, and is the largest exporter of
oil from Africa (Nuhu, 1997). According to Daniel Workman, Nigeria was the 8th
largest exporter of crude oil in 2016, exporting about US$ 27 billion worth of crude oil,
accounting for about 4% of global crude oil exports (Workman, 2017). In Nigeria, due
to the long period of exploitation of oil, and the deleterious effects of pollution of the
environment through spillages, whether accidental or through sabotage or deliberate
discharges, several laws have been passed to regulate the protection of the
environment, through prevention and combating of pollution due to the activities of
the exploration and exploitation companies. The Agency mandated to protect the
environment of Nigeria is the National Environmental Standards and Regulations
Enforcement Agency (NESREA), under the ministerial supervision of Nigeria’s
Ministry of Environment. The NESREA was established by an Act of Parliament, the
National Environment Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act
of 2007, which replaced the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act.
The NESREA Act is the embodiment of laws and regulations focused on the
protection and sustainable development of the environment of Nigeria and its natural
resources (ELRI, 2017).
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Ghana and Nigeria are partners in the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project, and have
other collaborations regarding supply of oil and gas along the West African coastline.
Ghana appears to have contemplated something in the regions of the NESREA in the
Marine Pollution Act, 2016, in establishing the Office of the National Coordinator, and
the National Contingency Plan. However, Ghana’s Office of the National Coordinator
seems to be rather inadequate, as by law, the Office is to coordinate the establishment
and execution of a National Contingency Plan, instead of being a full agency
responsible for protection of the marine environment with specific regard to
exploitation activities.

The NESREA has the task of ensuring compliance with various environmental laws
which come under its mandate, with the following being specifically relevant to oil and
gas exploitation:
-

Environmental Impact Assessment Act

-

The Land Use Act

-

Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act

-

Associated Gas Re-Injection Act

-

Oil Pipelines Act

-

Petroleum Act (ELRI, 2017).

Specifically, the NESREA Act 2007 gives the mandate to the NESREA to regulate the
Nigerian environment through 3 sections:
-

Section 7 provides the NESREA with the authority to ensure compliance with
environmental laws, local and international, on environmental sanitation and
pollution prevention and control through monitory and regulatory measures.

-

Section 8 (1) (k) empowers the Agency to make and review regulations on air
and water quality, effluent limitations, control of harmful substances and other
forms of environmental pollution and sanitation.

-

Section 27 prohibits, without lawful authority, the discharge of hazardous
substances into the environment.
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Since its inception, the NESREA is implementing existing regulations, and has also
passed, through Parliament, regulations to enable them execute their mandate,
including but not limited to:
-

National Effluent Limitation Regulations

-

National Environment Protection (Pollution Abatement and Industries and
Facilities Producing Waste) Regulations, 1991

-

Federal Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Regulations 1991

-

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act, CAP E12, LFN 2004

-

Land Use Act, CAP 202, LFN 2004

-

Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act, CAP H1, LFN 2004

-

Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act, CAP H5, LFN 2004

-

Oil in Navigable Waters Act, CAP 06, LFN 2004

-

Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, CAP 20, LFN 2004

-

Oil Pipelines Act, CAP 07, LFN 2004

-

Oil Pipelines Regulations

-

Petroleum Act, CAP P10, LFN 2004

-

Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations

-

Petroleum Refining Regulations

-

Petroleum Products and Distribution Act, CAP 12, LFN 2004

-

Mineral Oil Safety Regulations and Crude Oil Transportation and Shipment
Regulations

-

Environmental Sanitation Law

-

Environmental Pollution Control Law. (ELRI, 2017)

From the above, it can be seen that Nigeria has passed various Laws and Regulations
to regulate the environment, including the marine environment, with specific regards
to the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas, in the quest to prevent and control
pollution of the environment, especially due to oil spillages. This can be attributed to
the fact that Nigeria has been drilling oil for quite a long time, and has thus had the
opportunity to develop laws from their experiences, in order to forestall and combat
environmental damage due to spillages.
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Ghana, on the other hand, is a relatively new entrant on the oil and gas exploitation
scene, having discovered oil in 2007 and begun commercial production in 2010.
Before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the specific laws of Ghana which
sought to control and regulate pollution of the marine environment were:
-

Ghana Maritime Security Act, 2004, Act 675

-

Ghana Shipping Act, 2003, Act 645

-

Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994, Act 490

-

Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, Act 235.

These laws were mainly with regards to the transportation of oil through Ghanaian
waters and in Ghanaian ports, and had little or no relevance to exploration and
exploitation activities, though Ghana had been prospecting for oil since the GNPC
was incorporated in the 1960’s. These applicable laws were therefore inadequate to
protect Ghana’s marine environment in the event of a spillage during exploitation
activities for oil and gas.

In order to upgrade the laws of Ghana with specific regards to exploration and
exploitation of oil and gas in the advent of commercial drilling, the Ghana Maritime
Authority, enjoined by law to see to the protection of Ghana’s waters, in 2010
presented the Maritime Pollution Bill to Parliament for enactment. After several
reviews, the final Bill was presented to Parliament in October 2015 for enactment into
law. The Maritime Pollution Bill was “An Act to provide for the Prevention, Regulation
and Control of Pollution within the Territorial waters of Ghana and other maritime
zones under the control of Ghana, and for other related matters” (Maritime Pollution
Act, 2016).

The Bill was finally passed into law in 2016, but is yet to receive

presidential assent. According to the former Deputy Minister of Transport, Mrs Joyce
Bawa Mogtari, the Bill took a long time to pass because “It was initially based on the
MARPOL, but had to be fine-tuned to include other necessary inputs at the request of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), (Mogtari, 2015).

The Maritime Pollution Act is the most comprehensive Bill to date that incorporates
most of the Marine Pollution Conventions ratified by Ghana, and is the only Act (Law)
in Ghana that has a chapter on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
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Cooperation – Part 4, Chapter 8 (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016), as well as Liability
and Compensation for Pollution Damage – Part 5, and specifically Liability for Oil
Pollution – Part 5, Chapter 1. It also incorporates the tenets of the London Convention
1972, the International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972.

The Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 also for the first time specifically rests the
responsibility for the regulation of Ghana’s maritime domain in the Ghana Maritime
Authority (GMA), but enjoins the Authority to collaborate with the EPA in the exercise
of this mandate – Article 2 (1), (2), (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016). Again, the Act
creates a potential conflict between two governmental agencies in the regulation of
Ghana’s maritime domain, and such potential conflicts are a common feature in
Ghana’s laws, thereby creating a lag in ultimate responsibility amongst state
institutions in the execution of their mandate.

In fairness, however, for the implementation of the tenets of the Act, a specific
provision is made for the Act to apply to “an offshore installation” – Article 1 (a) (iii), a
new introduction to the laws regulating Ghana’s maritime domain. The Act, in Article
6, enjoins the GMA in collaboration with the EPA and other relevant agencies to, “in
relation to maritime pollution activities within the purview of the IMO;
(a) Directly or through the IMO, observe, measure, evaluate, and analyse by
scientific methods recognised by the IMO the risks or effects of pollution of the
marine environment; and
(b) In particular keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which it
permits or engages in for the purpose of determining whether these activities
are likely to pollute the marine environment”.
The Act therefore makes provision for the monitoring of offshore activities against
pollution of the marine environment.

Chapter 8 of the Act spells out the conditions for Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation. Article 184 (2) enjoins “an operator of an offshore
installation within the territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Ghana
to have an oil pollution emergency plan
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(a) Coordinated with the system established … and
(b) Approved in accordance with procedures established by the National
Coordinator.” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016)
Article 187 (1) establishes a “national system for the prompt and effective response
to oil pollution incidents” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016).

This is to ensure that

spillages are promptly and effectively dealt with to minimise pollution, and Article 187
(3) enjoins the National Coordinator to “prepare a national contingency plan for
preparedness and response” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016), in accordance with the
tenets of the Contingency Planning Manual on Oil Pollution adopted by the IMO. Sub
section (4) of Article 187 requires that the National Coordinator also establishes,
“either unilaterally or through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, and in cooperation
with the oil and shipping industries, port authorities and other relevant entities;
(a) A minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment;
(b) A programme of exercises for oil pollution response organisation and training
of relevant personnel;
(c) Detailed plans and communication capabilities … regarding an oil pollution
incident;
(d) Mechanisms and arrangements to coordinate response to an oil pollution
incident” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016).

This chapter therefore clearly contemplates oil pollution incidents during actual
exploitation, and attempts to safeguard the marine environment by prescribing
preventive and combating measures in case of a spillage. However, no specific
responsibility is laid on the operators of the oil fields to prevent or forestall any such
spillage, and they are also not held to strict combative measures to be put in place
during exploitation activities.
2.13 Regulatory Framework for Drilling Operations
Nigeria, Ghana’s closest West African Neighbour with extensive operations in the
exploitation of oil and gas, “operates a command and control regulatory framework in
their oil and gas sector, which framework was prevalent in the United States and
Britain during the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, factors such as red tape, over-
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regulation and regulatory capture are some criticisms of this type of regime” (Ekhator,
2016), and it is not surprising that so much pollution is prevalent in Nigeria’s waters
and land, despite the command and control regime.

For the environment to be protected from pollution due to actual drilling operations,
there must be concrete measures put in place by the exploitation companies
themselves on site to prevent and combat any spillage before they get out of hand.
Experience has shown that a process-based pollution prevention method can work
very well when implemented properly. Such a process is “a framework to help a
business identify pollution prevention opportunities, analyse their cost effectiveness,
identify areas for improvement and develop action plans for implementation” (Oil
Conservation Division, 2000). It will also entail analysing what type of combating
equipment to have on site, depending on the type of risk identified, in order to be most
effective in combating a spillage, should it happen.

Over the last 2 to 3 decades, emphasis has shifted from pollution control (waste
management) to pollution prevention (waste minimisation) (Oil Conservation Division,
2000).

Pollution prevention methods have been found to be most effective in

forestalling environmental disasters, and more and more, companies are perfecting
their systems and efforts at preventing pollution from their exploitation activities.
Thus, more management commitment to processes of pollution prevention are
advocated and practiced, and organisations have found this to be very effective in
protecting the marine environment. Organisations have developed their own systems
approaches and incorporated them into the organisational plans so that they are
implemented alongside normal organisational goals.

Following the Macondo Well blowout on the Deepwater Horizon in April 2010, several
reports have been produced after investigations from various organisations, including
regulatory agencies, and among the recommendations from the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement was the following:
-

That “the responsible parties, including the lessee, operator and drilling
contractor, be required to effectively manage all safety critical elements
(SCE’s) – technical, operational and organisational – thereby ensuring their
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effective operation and reducing major accident risk to As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP)” (Final Report: Macondo Investigation Report, 2016)
-

This requirement includes “requirement for all responsible parties, including
contractors, to conduct monitoring for continuous active assurance of all
identified safety critical elements through each SCE’s lifecycle” (Final Report:
Macondo Investigation Report, 2016)

The American Petroleum Institute (API) also recommended, amongst others;
-

“development and implementation of a safety critical element (SCE)
management

system that

includes the minimum

necessary “shall”

requirements in the standard, to establish and maintain effective safety
barriers to prevent major accidents”, (Final Report: Macondo Investigation
Report, 2016)
-

“methodologies for the identification of SCE’s and the development of
performance standards of each SCE, including its functionality, availability,
survivability and interactions with other systems”, (Final Report: Macondo
Investigation Report, 2016).

The Final Report on the Macondo Well blowout actually places the onus on the
operators and contractors to ensure that preventive measures (e.g., BOPs) are in
place on site, and are constantly monitored to ensure their operational effectiveness.

The recommendations also prescribe combat readiness for accidental spillages at the
drill sites, including the provision of containment booms and containment chambers,
as well as chemical dispersants on site to combat spillages, though these are
standard practice, but woefully inadequate in case of a blowout, as the effects of a
blowout cannot be adequately predicted in order to provide adequate combative
equipment. Therefore, from all indications, preventive measures or a preventive
system is the best method of protecting the environment from the debilitating effects
of a spillage in actual drilling activities.
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2.14 Legislating Drilling Operations in Ghana
The Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 does not have any specific provisions requiring
particular preventive or combative equipment of the drilling companies during actual
drilling.

They are only required to cooperate with the National Coordinator in

preparing the National Contingency Plan for preparedness and contingency. Thus,
the law does not place any onus on drilling companies with particular respect to
containment booms, containment chambers, chemical dispersants or other such
combating equipment. Neither does the law place any onus on drilling companies
with regards to testing or effectiveness of safety measures and equipment such as
BOP’s, or even prescribe actual “safety drills” on site to ensure that all crew concerned
know what to do and are able to effectively perform their various roles in the event of
a spillage. There is therefore the need to promulgate regulations to give effect to the
Act when it receives presidential assent.
The EPA, entrusted with the protection of Ghana’s environment against pollution, has
in the meantime developed a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, 2015, which seeks
to address some of the gaps which the law does not specifically address with regards
to actual drilling operations. The Plan prescribes the role of the EPA as one of
“coordination and provision of technical advice on logistics, maintenance, materials
and equipment, and training”, and requires operators to “develop tactical oil spill
contingency plans at their facilities” (EPA, 2016). The Plan specifically identifies risks
of marine pollution resulting from “collisions, stranding, blowouts and other marine
accidents” (EPA, 2016) in Ghana’s waters subsequent to commencement of
exploitation activities in the oil fields, and the deleterious and “disastrous effects such
an incident could have on the ecological as well as socio-economic resources
alongside the coastline of Ghana” (EPA, 2016).
The Plan is therefore, in addition to other objectives, to “delineate responsibilities for
the preparation and operational response to incidents, which could re result in spillage
of oil into the marine, as well as coastal environment (EPA, 2016) of Ghana, and
designates the EPA with the “overall responsibility to deal with any incident involving
oil installations, oil pipelines or shipping” (EPA, 2016).
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The Plan is intended to also “provide a framework for coordination of an integrated
response to protect the marine environment from deleterious effects of pollution from
spillages of oil substances” (EPA, 2016); and to “promote and ensure the
development of local plans to prepare and respond to such incidents in accordance
with best practices” (EPA, 2016).

The Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964 failed to address the issue of marine pollution
due to exploitation activities, thus the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 seeks to address
this anomaly. Ghana does not have any other legislation relating to protection of the
marine environment with regards to actual drilling; though the EPA Act 1994 enjoins
the EPA to protect the environment of Ghana, it does not specifically address the
issue of oil exploitation, and damage to the environment due to such exploitation.

44

CHAPTER 3

3.0 FINDINGS

3.1

Introduction

This chapter looks at the findings from the administered questionnaires and interviews
conducted1. The chapter groups the research questions into 5 broad categories as
mentioned earlier, and the analysis is made along these categories.
3.2

Existence of Legal Regime in Ghana to Prevent/Combat a Spillage from
Exploitation Activities

3.2.1

The International Scene

On the international scene, there is a paucity of Conventions/Protocols that relate
particularly to prevention of pollution from exploitation activities, though much has
been done with regards to prevention of pollution through transportation. Although
an attempt has been made through regional Conventions and Protocols like the
Abidjan Convention, these look at prevention of pollution in general, thus pollution
from exploitation activities have not been particularly catered for. In a seeming
attempt to address this shortfall, guidelines have been developed for the prevention
and combat of spillages, from both transportation and exploitation activities. These
guidelines, however, do not have the force of legally binding conventions and
protocols, and thus fall short of addressing the specific problem of pollution from
exploitation activities.

3.2.2

The Ghanaian Situation

Respondents for this question were drawn from the GMA, EPA and the exploitation
companies. In order to answer this question, 3 criteria needed to be met for a positive
conclusion to be drawn to the question. They are:
Samples of the Questionnaire and Structured Interviews for the respondents are included in the
research as Appendices
1
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 Whether there was a law available or in place
 Whether there was a designated institution to see to the implementation of the
law
 Whether the law was being implemented.

Responses from the institutions polled are indicated in the tables and graphs below:
Table 1: Existence of a Law to Prevent/Combat an Oil Spill due to Exploitation Activities

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA Exploitation Companies

Is there a law in Ghana to
prevent/combat an oil spill due Yes
to exploitation activities?

Yes

Yes

Is There a Law on Spill Prevention/Combat

100

100
GMA
EPA
Exploitation Companies

100

Figure 6: Existence of a Law to Prevent/Combat an Oil Spill due to Exploitation Activities

From the above responses, all the respondents agreed that there is indeed a legal
regime to prevent/combat a spill due to exploitation activities.
Table 2: Existence of Designated Institution to Implement the Law

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA Exploitation Companies

Is there a designated institution
in Ghana to implement this law Yes

Yes
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Yes

Designated Institution to Implement Law

100

100
GMA
EPA
Exploitation Companies

100

Figure 7: Existence of Designated Institution to Implement the Law

Again, from the responses, all the institutions polled agreed that there was a
designated institution to implement the law with regards to prevention and combat of
a spillage due to exploitation activities.
Table 3: Is the Law Being Implemented

QUESTION
Is the law being implemented

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA Exploitation Companies
Yes
Yes
Yes

Implementation of Law on Spill
Combat/Prevention

100

100
GMA
EPA
Exploitation Companies

100

Figure 8: Implementation of the Law
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The institutions polled believe that the law on prevention and combat of a spillage due
to exploitation activities was being implemented.

From the responses received, the institutions polled believe that Ghana had a legal
regime in place to prevent and/or combat a spillage should it occur during exploitation
of oil from Ghana’s oil fields.

3.3 Existence of Proactive Measures to Prevent and/or Combat a Spillage
To find out whether proactive measures actually existed to prevent and/or combat a
spillage should it occur during exploitation activities, the entire population of the
selected organisations and institutions were polled. These comprised the GMA, EPA,
Exploitation Companies, Ghana Navy, GPHA and the RMU. The RMU was added as
they were the premier institution training local content to work in the oil fields, and
would have to include in their training proactive measures to prevent and combat a
spillage. To answer this question, it was further sub-divided into the following criteria:
 Whether there were proactive measures in place to prevent/combat a spillage
 Whether the measures adhered to any laid down procedure
 Whether the stakeholders were trained in preventing/combating a spillage
due to exploitation activities
 Whether there was a Stipulated Plan to prevent/combat a spillage
 Whether there was a designated Lead Organisation in prevention/combat of a
spillage
 Which

organisation

was

the

Lead

Organisation

responsible

for

prevention/combat of a spillage
 Whether there are available equipment to stakeholder institutions to
prevent/combat a spillage
 Whether there were periodic drills on prevention/combat of a spillage

The responses received from the respondents are indicated in the tables and graphs
below:

48

Table 4: Existence of Proactive Measures to Prevent/Combat a Spillage

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY

Are there proactive
measures to prevent Yes
or combat a spill?

Yes

Yes

GPHA

Exploitation
Companies

RMU

Yes

Yes

Yes

Existence of Prescribed Proactive Measures

100

100

GMA
EPA

100

100
100

RMU
GPHA

100

Navy
Exploitation Companies

Figure 9: Existence of Proactive Measures

From the responses received on the above question, all the organisations agreed that
there were indeed proactive measures to prevent and combat spillages in the oil fields
in Ghana.
Table 5: Do Measures Adhere to Laid Down Procedure

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY
(%)
(%)
(%)

Do the measures
adhere to laid down 30
procedure?

100

14
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GPHA
(%)

Exploitation
Companies (%)

RMU
(%)

20

100

0

Proactive Measures According to Procedure (%)
100
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

100

30
20
10

GMA

EPA

RMU

GPHA

14

Navy

Exploitation
Companies

Figure 10: Do Measures Adhere to Laid Down Procedure

From the responses received, only the EPA and Exploitation companies attest to the
fact that the measures prescribed to prevent and combat a spillage adhere to laid
down procedure. The GMA indicated that the appropriate laid down procedure was
yet to be backed by regulation, the Navy indicated that they had little or no knowledge
of any laid down procedure, the RMU indicated that they were training students based
on internationally recognised standards (OPITO), but not according to any standards
set by local laws, the GPHA, as the major supplier to the oil fields, indicated that their
procedure was based on industry standards. The Exploitation companies, though
agreeing that there was a laid down procedure prescribed for them by the EPA,
indicated that they adhered to their own industry standard, which they believed was
higher than that set for them by the EPA. Based on the responses, it is difficult to
conclude that all the stakeholders are on the same page with regards to measures
and procedures for preventing and combating a spillage. If indeed the EPA, which all
agree is the implementing agency for the law on protecting the environment has such
a procedure, it should be made standard for all the stakeholders, to ensure that they
all adhere to the same procedure with regards to prevention and combating of a spill.
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Table 6: Are Stakeholders Trained in Preventing/Combating a Spillage

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY
(%)
(%)
(%)

Are your staff trained
in preventing and 0
combating spills?

0

57

GPHA
(%)

Exploitation
Companies (%)

RMU
(%)

100

100

100

Trained Staff in Spill Prevention/Combat (%)
100
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

100

100

57

0

0

GMA

EPA

RMU

GPHA

Navy

Exploitation
Companies

Figure 11: Are Stakeholders Trained in Preventing/Combating a Spillage

Respondents from the EPA and GMA indicated that their staff were not trained to
prevent or combat a spill. However, the GPHA agreed that their staff were trained,
and 57% of respondents from the Ghana Navy indicated that they were so trained,
whilst the RMU indicated that they were training their students as well in the
prevention and combat of a spillage. The exploitation companies all maintained that
their staff were well trained in preventing and combating spills. It must be noted here
that the local residents also indicated that they had no knowledge of prevention or
combat of a spillage, and no training or sensitisation had been given them in this
regard as well. This indicated that the regulatory agencies, as well as the Navy, which
is primarily for security, are not trained in the prevention and combat of a spillage, but
rather the exploitation companies and the service providers (GPHA) do have that
training, because they deal directly with the exploiting of oil from the oil fields.
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Table 7: Existence of a Stipulated Prevention/Combat Plan for a Spill

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY
(%)
(%)
(%)

Is there a stipulated
Plan for preventing or 100
combating a spill?

100

42

GPHA
(%)

Exploitation
Companies (%)

RMU
(%)

100

100

100

Existing Spill Prevention/Combat Plan (%)
100

100

100

100

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

100

42

GMA

EPA

GPHA

RMU

Navy

Exploitation
Companies

Figure 12: Existence of a Stipulated Prevention/Combat Plan for a Spill

42% of respondents from the Navy indicated that they were aware of an existing Spill
Prevention and Control Plan, and the RMU indicated that they were indeed training
their students according to a Plan on Oil Spill Prevention and Combat. The other
organisations indicated that indeed there was an existing plan to prevent oil spills at
the exploitation sites, and to combat one if it should occur. This Plan is the National
Contingency Plan for Oil Spill Preparedness and Response, enshrined in the Maritime
Pollution Act, 2016, which was to be established by the National Coordinator as part
of the duties of that office.
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Table 8: Existence of a Designated Lead Organisation in Spill Prevention/Combat

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY
(%)
(%)
(%)

Is there a designated
organisation to lead or 100
coordinate
the
prevention
and
combat of a spill?

100

100

GPHA
(%)

Exploitation
Companies (%)

RMU
(%)

100

100

100

Existence of Designated Lead Organisation for
Spill Prevention/Combat
100

100

100

100

100

GMA

EPA

GPHA

100

RMU

Navy

Exploitation Companies

Figure 13: Existence of a Designated Lead Organisation for Spill Prevention and Combat

Responses from all the organisations polled indicated that there was a designated
Lead Organisation to coordinate activities for spill prevention and combat. This is also
in accordance with the tenets of the National Spill Response Plan.
Table 9: Designated Lead Organisation in Spill Prevention/Combat

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY
(%)
(%)
(%)

What
is
the
designated
lead 17
agency to coordinate
the prevention and
combat of a spill?

17

66
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GPHA
(%)

Exploitation
Companies (%)

RMU
(%)

0

0

0

Designated Lead Organisation for Spill Response
(%)
66

70
60
50
40
30
20

17

17

10

0

0

0

0
GMA

EPA

GPHA

RMU

Navy

Exploitation
Companies

Figure 14: Designated Lead Organisation for Spill Prevention and Combat

17% of respondents indicated that the GMA was the Designated Lead Organisation
for spill response, and 17% indicated it was the EPA, whilst 66% indicated it was the
Ghana Navy. However, in actual practice at various drills held, the Navy has been
the lead organisation and on-scene commander. This clearly indicates a conflict in
organisational responsibility, and would not bode well for the country in an actual
situation of an oil spill, as the lines of communication and authority are not clear cut,
and may thus cause confusion and delays, to the detriment of the environment.
Table 10: Availability of Spill Prevention/Combat Equipment

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY
(%)
(%)
(%)

Do you have the
equipment to prevent 0
or combat a spill?

0

0
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GPHA
(%)

Exploitation
(%)

100

100

Companies

Availability of Response Equipment (%)
100
100
90
80
70
60
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40
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20
10
0

0

0

0

EPA

GMA

Navy

GPHA

100

Exploitation
Companies

Figure 15: Availability of Spill Prevention/Combat Equipment

The responses indicate that none of the regulatory agencies have any equipment for
prevention or combating of a spill. Only the exploitation companies, and the GPHA
as a service organisation for the oil industry, have the equipment to prevent and
combat a spill should one occur.

However, responses from both organisations

indicate that they have standard equipment with regards to the industry, including
booms, skimmers, isolation chambers and chemical dispersants. The exploitation
companies also indicated that they perform monthly checks on their Blow Out
Preventers (BOPs) and semi-annual full maintenance checks on them.
Table 11: Organisation of Periodic Drills on Prevention/Combat of a Spill

QUESTION

ORGANISATION
GMA EPA NAVY

Are there periodic
drills on prevention Yes
and combat of a spill?

Yes

Yes
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GPHA

Exploitation Companies

Yes

Yes

Periodic Prevention/Combat Drills

100

100

GMA
EPA

100

100

GPHA
Navy

100

Exploitation Companies

Figure 16: Organisation of Periodic Drills on Prevention/Combat of a Spill

All the organisations polled stated that there was an annual drill on Spill Prevention
and Combat, which was coordinated by the Navy, as the on-scene commander. In
addition, the exploitation companies stated that they held semi-annual joint drills on
their own, as the exploitation companies, in order to be able to prevent, detect and
combat a spill to prevent environmental damage.

3.4

Existence of National Provision to Engage International Aid in Spill
Combat
To ascertain the veracity or otherwise of this statement, questions were asked of 4
organisations – the GMA, the EPA, the Navy and the Exploitation Companies. To
answer this question, it was further sub-divided into the following criteria in the
questionnaire:
 Whether there was national regulation to engage foreign aid in spill combat
 Whether there was any protocol to engage such foreign aid in spill combat
 Whether there was any existing contract/protocol with any particular entity for
aid in spill combat
 How long it would take for such foreign aid to be activated

Responses received to these questions are summarised in the tables and graphs
below:
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Table 12: Existence of national regulation to call in foreign aid in spill combat

QUESTION
ORGANISATION
Is there national regulation to call for GMA
EPA
NAVY Exploitation
foreign assistance in preventing and/or
Companies
combating a spill
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Existing Regulation for Foreign
Assistance
100

100

GMA
EPA

100

100

Navy
Exploitation Companies

Figure 17: Existence of national regulation to solicit foreign aid in spill combat

All responding organisations indicated that there indeed existed national regulation to
solicit foreign assistance in preventing and/or combating a spill.
Table 13: Existence of Protocol to solicit foreign aid in spill combat

QUESTION
ORGANISATION
Is there any protocol for soliciting foreign GMA
EPA
NAVY Exploitation
assistance
in
preventing
and/or
Companies
combating a spill
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Existing Protocol to solicit foreign
assistance
100

100

GMA
EPA

100

100

Navy
Exploitation Companies

Figure 18: Existence of protocol to solicit foreign aid in spill combat

All responding organisations indicated that there were national protocols to solicit
foreign assistance in preventing and/or combating a spill. They explained that Ghana
was a signatory to the Abidjan Convention, and also the United Nations Environment
Programme, which both sought to protect the marine environment against pollution,
and thus the country could call in foreign assistance when needed.
Table 14: Existence of Contract for assistance in spill combat

QUESTION
Is there any existing contract
preventing and/or combating a spill

ORGANISATION
in GMA
EPA
NAVY Exploitation
Companies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Existence of Contract for Spill Combat
Assistance
100

100

GMA
EPA

100

Navy

100

Exploitation Companies

Figure 19: Existence of contract foreign assistance in spill combat

All the respondents polled indicated that there was an existing contract/agreement
with Oil Services Response Ltd for the combat of a spillage, should it occur. In
addition, the exploitation companies indicated that they variously had agreements
with West African Oil Spill Network, and the International Oil Spill Organisation in the
UK, for assistance in the event of a spill which was above their capacity to handle.
Table 15: How long would it take for such foreign aid to be activated?

QUESTION
ORGANISATION
How much time would it take for such GMA
EPA
NAVY
foreign aid in combating a spill to be (Hrs)
(Hrs)
(Hrs)
activated?
24
24
24

59

Exploitation
Companies
(Hrs)
12

Time Lag to Engage Assistance in Spill
Combat (Hrs)
12

24

GMA
EPA

24

Navy

24

Exploitation Companies

Figure 20: How long it would take to activate foreign assistance in spill combat

Responses from the regulatory agencies showed that it would take 24 hours to
engage foreign assistance in combating a spill, whilst the exploitation companies
indicated that they would take 12 hours to call in assistance when needed.

3.5

Existence of Compensatory Regime for a Spillage, and Existence of
Specific Responsibility/Sanctions for such Regime
Questions on this statement sought to find out whether there was a regulatory regime
for compensation in case of an oil spill, and if so, which organisation would see to the
implementation of this regime. They also sought to find out whether the law placed
specific responsibility on any organisation to effect the compensation, and/or
prescribed any sanctions for such organisation should they fail to effect
compensation. Respondents were drawn from the GMA and the EPA, as regulatory
agencies. The questions were categorised into:
 Whether there was a regulation to exact compensation for oil pollution
damage;
 Whether there was a designated institution to implement such a regulation;
 Whether the regulation identified any specific organisation responsible for
paying such compensation;
 Whether any sanctions were prescribed for defaulting organisations.
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Responses to these questions were all in the affirmative. The responses indicated
that the law designated the GMA as the agency to implement the compensatory
regime set out by law, and the regulations spelt out clearly a “polluter pays” policy,
i.e., that the company identified as being responsible for the pollution would be held
responsible for paying any compensation determined by the law. Again, the GMA
could exact administrative sanctions on any organisation identified which failed to
effect the compensation, which sanctions included preventing such companies from
operating until all compensation issues had been resolved, or even revoking their
operating licence.

3.6

Incorporation of Local Conditions and Population in Spill Prevention,
Combat and Compensation Regime
This question sought to find out whether local conditions, including currents, tides and
flow patterns had been factored into any prevention and combat preparations
established in the oil fields. Responses from the regulatory agencies, the Navy and
the exploitation companies indicated that indeed, this was standard practice, and the
RMU also indicated that they included this in their training of local content, as it was
standard procedure to factor in local conditions in the prevention and combat of a
spillage.

However, all the respondents indicated that the local population had not been involved
in any preventive or combat measures, and indeed they were prevented from
engaging in any activities in or near the oil fields, as their activities might be potential
hazards and cause pollution incidents.
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CHAPTER 4

4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1

Conclusions

SDG 14 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) adopted in
September 2015 is on “Life Below Water” and aims at laying the foundation for the
integrated and sustainable management of the oceans (Cornier & Elliot, 2017), in
order to “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs” (Kates, Parris and Leiserowitz, 2016). Crude
oil is a big pollutant, especially of the marine environment, and it is not surprising
therefore that the IMO has placed emphasis on protection of the marine environment
from pollution by crude oil.

However, this emphasis has mainly been on the

transportation of the crude, and there is little or no international regulation regarding
the exploitation of the crude, and the pollution it can cause.

Ghana, as a relatively new entrant on the crude oil exploitation scene, is thus
constrained in implementing laws which would protect its marine environment with
specific regard to exploitation activities, as this has over the years in other
jurisdictions, mainly been left to local legislation to regulate, and more often than not,
has been regulated through learning from rather avoidable experiences. It is in this
light that Ghana in 2016 passed the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016, which seeks to
regulate somewhat exploitation of Ghana’s marine resources with specific regard to
pollution of the marine environment. In an attempt to reduce marine pollution to the
barest minimum, the Marine Pollution Act, 2016 establishes the National Coordinator
and a National Contingency Plan to combat a spill at the earliest possible time, but
implementation of this Plan has come with its own problems.

Though Ghana had the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, this was obviously not
adequate in the wake of oil discovery, and some review/amendments of this Act is
found in the Marine Pollution Act, 2016.
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Ghana, however, has to pass an act

specifically regulating the exploitation of its marine resources, such as has been done
in Nigeria with the NESREA Act, which effectively consolidated all the laws relating to
the protection of the environment, especially with regards to exploitation of oil. This
thus puts forward a compelling argument for a review of the EPA Act, 1994, which
can consolidate the environmental laws without having to go through the process of
passing a whole new law on the environment.

With the promulgation of the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016, implementation should be
vested in the ambit of one institution, as the Act itself establishes the office of the
National Coordinator. In the absence of clear and concise lines of authority and
responsibility, it has fallen to the Ghana Navy to coordinate activities with regards to
spill combating. This has the tendency of creating a lethargic attitude amongst the
other regulatory agencies, as they may feel that their authority is being usurped.
Again, these institutions are not resourced in spill combating, and the Navy is also
under-resourced, such that they have to fall on the oil exploitation companies to
provide said resources to combat a spill. This is not in the best interest of the country,
as the companies are profit oriented, and would only provide the barest equipment
required to comply with the law which granted them the licence to exploit the marine
resources.

Ghana has some bilateral agreements on spill combat, including agreement with the
Oil Spill Response Ltd (OSRL) and the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), and is also signatory to the Abidjan Convention, so can safely rely on
international aid to combat a spill, but again, the time lapse before such aid can be
called in is wide enough for any accidental spill to get out of control. Another issue of
concern is the “polluter pays” principle on issues of compensation for oil pollution
damage, as it might take some time for such polluter to mobilise resources to effect
the compensation, which might not be good for the country, especially where
international assistance in combating a spill is involved.

Finally, it is important to point out that though an attempt has been made to regulate
the oil extraction industry with regards to pollution of the marine environment, Ghana
is not well placed to combat a spill of enormous proportions such as one caused by a
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blowout, and such a spill can cause grave environmental damage before it can be
brought under control, if the current regime is left as it is.
4.2

Recommendations

In order to place Ghana on good footing with regards to prevention and combat of a
spillage due to exploitation activities, the following recommendations are proffered:
 Review/Amend the EPA Act, 1994 to consolidate all environmental protection
laws, taking into particular consideration the advent of commercial production
of oil.
 Review the compensation regime currently in place to have a permanent fund
to cater for compensation in cases of oil pollution damage.
 Clearly define lines of authority and responsibility for the organisation
responsible for coordinating and leading any spill response, as enshrined in
the National Contingency Plan, and circulate same to all stakeholder
institutions, in order to have unity of command and responsibility in the event
of a spill.
 Train, resource and equip the EPA to have permanent representatives at the
exploitation sites, to also conduct independent monitoring of activities, and to
have a first-hand report of any spills or potential hazards to the marine
environment.
 Sensitise the local communities around the exploitation sites on the dangers
of their fishing activities at the drill sites, in order to get their cooperation on
the restriction of those areas, so as to free the Navy from the daily
responsibility of keeping the fishermen away.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE/STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE GHANA MARITIME
AUTHORITY
1. Ghana’s Parliament has passed the Maritime Pollution Bill in 2016, but it has
not yet received Presidential Assent. Does the Ghana Maritime Authority
(GMA) have the mandate of executing the tenets of this Bill once it receives
Presidential Assent? Yes/No
2. If YES to (1) above, does the mandate include prevention and combating of
oil pollution in Ghana’s oil fields? Yes/No
3. Apart from the GMA, which other organisations have the mandate of ensuring
prevention and combat of oil spills at the oil fields?
4. Does the GMA have any collaboration with these organisations with regards
to preventing and combating an oil spill at the oil fields? Yes/No
5. Which organisation would play the lead role in the prevention of an oil spill at
the oil fields?
6. Which organization would play the lead role in the combat of an oil spill at the
oil fields, should one occur?
7. Does the GMA play any regulatory role regarding the operators at the oil
fields? Yes/No
8. If YES to (7) above, what role?
9. Can the GMA enforce preventive measures towards an oil spill with regards
to the operators at the oil fields? Yes/No
10. If YES to (9) above, in what way?
11. Can the GMA enforce combative measures in the event of an oil spill at the oil
fields? Yes/No
12. If YES to (11) above, in what way?
13. Is the GMA required to have on-site inspectors at the oil fields towards the
prevention of an oil spill? Yes/No
14. If YES to (13) above, does the GMA have these inspectors on site? Yes/No
15. Does the GMA have any standby equipment to prevent/combat an oil spill at
the oil fields? Yes/No
16. If YES to (15) above, to what level are these equipment adequate (as
described by the Maritime Pollution Bill)?
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
17. Does the GMA have the mandate to prescribe which preventive/combative
measures need to be put in place by the operators in the oil fields? Yes/No
18. Can the GMA call in foreign aid to help combat an oil spill should it occur at
the oil fields? Yes/No
19. If YES to (18) above, who will be responsible for compensating such foreign
aid called in to help combat a spillage should one occur?
20. Can the GMA sanction operating companies in the oil fields in the event of an
oil spillage? Yes/No
21. Is the GMA involved in educating the local population near the oil fields on oil
pollution prevention? Yes/No
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22. If YES to (21) above, has any education taken place on pollution prevention
since the commencement of commercial exploitation at the oil fields? Yes/No
23. Is the GMA involved in educating the local population near the oil fields on oil
pollution combating? Yes/No
24. If YES to (23) above, has any education taken place on combating of oil
pollution amongst the local population since the commencement of
commercial drilling? Yes/No
25. Would the GMA be involved in the calculation of any compensation to be paid
in the event of a spillage at the oil fields? Yes/No
26. If YES to (25) above, does the GMA have the mandate to enforce any such
awards according to law? Yes/No
27. The Maritime Pollution Bill stipulates the establishment of a National
Coordinator to “Prepare a National Contingency Plan for preparedness and
response” in case of an oil spill. Has this National Coordinator been
established? Yes/No
28. If YES to (27) above, has a National Contingency Plan been prepared, as
stipulated by the Bill? Yes/No
29. If NO to (27) above, how soon is the National Coordinator expected to be set
up?
30. If NO to (28) above, how soon is the National Contingency Plan expected to
be set up?
31. Is there any other information you can give regarding the GMA’s involvement
in the prevention and combat of an oil spill at Ghana’s oil fields?
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APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE/STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Act, Act 490, was passed in
1994. Has the EPA considered any revisions/amendments to the Act?
Yes/No
2. If YES to (1) above, have any revisions/amendments been presented to
Parliament, especially in the wake of commencement of commercial
exploitation of oil and gas in Ghana? Yes/No
3. Has the EPA proposed any revisions/amendments to the Oil in Navigable
Waters Act, Act 235 of 1964, especially in the wake of commercial exploitation
of oil and gas in Ghana? Yes/No
4. If YES to (3) above, have these revisions/amendments been presented to
Parliament? Yes/No
5. If NO to (3) above, is the EPA considering proposing any
revisions/amendments to the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, Act 235 of 1964?
Yes/No
6. Has the EPA set any standards to be complied with by the exploitation
companies in the wake of oil and gas discovery in Ghanaian waters? Yes/No
7. If YES to (6) above, are these standards spelt out in the Environmental Impact
Assessment of the operators in Ghana’s oil fields? Yes/No
8. If YES to (6) above, does the EPA have the logistics to monitor adherence to
these set standards? Yes/No
9. If YES to (6) above, does the EPA have the personnel to monitor adherence
to these set standards? Yes/No
10. If YES to (6) above, are there any prescribed measures to be undertaken in
the event of non-compliance with these set standards? Yes/No
11. If YES to (6) above, does the EPA have the mandate to prevent the
exploitation companies from operating, in case they do not comply with these
set standards? Yes/No
12. Does the EPA have any prescribed pollution prevention measures in place to
be complied with by the exploitation companies in Ghana’s oil fields? Yes/No
13. If YES to (12) above, does the EPA have the mandate to halt the exploitation
activities of these companies in the event of non-compliance with these
measures? Yes/No
14. Can the EPA demand immediate curtailing of exploitation activities on the
discovery of an environmental threat due to pollution from the exploitation
activities? Yes/No
15. Does the EPA have the mandate to request combating of a spillage at the oil
fields from the exploitation companies in case of such a spill? Yes/No
16. Does the EPA have the mandate to prescribe specific pollution combat
measures/equipment for the exploitation companies? Yes/No
17. Is the EPA directly involved in environmental pollution prevention at the oil
fields, e.g., in operational procedures? Yes/No
18. Is the EPA directly involved in combating a spill to prevent environmental
pollution should it occur at the oil fields? Yes/No
19. Does the EPA have the requisite equipment and technical know-how in
combating an oil spill at the oil fields, should one occur? Yes/No
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20. Is the EPA involved in securing foreign aid to help combat an environmental
disaster, should a spillage occur at the oil fields? Yes/No
21. If YES to (20) above, in what way?
22. Is the EPA directly involved in any compensatory regime in the event of an oil
spill at the oil fields, should one occur? Yes/No
23. If YES to (22) above, in what way?
24. Is the EPA directly involved in any other way with regards to prevention and
combating of a spillage at the oil fields? Yes/No
25. If YES to (24) above, in what way?
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APPENDIX 3
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE GHANA NAVY
1. Is the Ghana Navy directly involved in the provision of security at the oil fields
offshore Ghana? Yes/No
2. Is the Ghana Navy well equipped in the provision of security at the oil fields
offshore Ghana? Yes/No
3. Is the Ghana Navy directly involved in the provision of preventive measures in
case of an oil spill at the oil fields? Yes/No
4. If YES to question (3) above, in what way?
5. If YES to question (3) above, is the Ghana Navy well equipped for the
prevention of an oil spill at the oil fields? Yes/No
6. If YES to question (5) above, are the equipment specific to local conditions
with regards to preventing an oil spill? Yes/No
7. Is the Ghana Navy technically prepared in the prevention of an oil spill at the
oil fields? Yes/No
8. Are personnel of the Ghana Navy permanently stationed at the oil fields in the
provision of security? Yes/No
9. If YES to question (8) above, are the personnel of the Ghana Navy trained in
the prevention of oil spills? Yes/No
10. Does the Ghana Navy have any laid down procedure incorporated into
standard operations at the oil fields with respect to prevention of an oil spill?
Yes/No
11. Does the Ghana Navy have the legal mandate to stop production activities in
case of a spillage at the oil fields? Yes/No
12. Is the Ghana Navy directly involved in the combat of an oil spill at the oil fields,
should it occur? Yes/No
13. If YES to question (12) above, in what way?
14. Is the Ghana Navy well trained in combating oil spills? Yes/No
15. Does the Ghana Navy have the resources to help combat an oil spill should it
occur at the oil fields? Yes/No
16. Can the Ghana Navy call on other security services to help combat an oil spill
should it occur at the oil fields? Yes/No
17. Can the Ghana Navy call on other nations in the sub-region to help combat a
spillage, should it occur in the oil fields? Yes/No
18. If YES to question (17) above, are there any protocols to this effect? Yes/No
19. If YES to question (17) above, how much time may elapse before a response
is received? 12 hrs.
24 hrs.
48 hrs.
72 hrs.
20. Is there any other information you may give regarding the Ghana Navy’s
involvement in prevention and combat of an oil spill at the oil fields?
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APPENDIX 4
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE GHANA PORTS & HARBOURS AUTHORITY
1. Is the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) a premier provider of
services to companies directly involved in exploitation activities in Ghana’s oil
fields? Yes/No
2. Has the GPHA factored into its operations the real possibility of an oil spill in
Ghana’s oil fields? Yes/No
3. Is the GPHA directly involved in prevention of an oil spill in Ghana’s waters?
Yes/No
4. If YES to (3) above, in what capacity?
5. Does the GPHA have the technical and logistic capacity to help combat an oil
spill should one occur in Ghana’s oil fields? Yes/No
6. Is the GPHA involved in drills towards the combat of an oil spill in Ghana’s oil
fields? Yes/No
7. Does the GPHA have an Oil Spill Contingency Plan as spelt out in the
Contingency Planning Manual on Oil Pollution adopted by the International
Maritime Organisation? Yes/No
8. Are there any specific materials prescribed for mitigating or containing an oil
spill during drilling operations? Yes/No
9. If YES to (8) above, is the GPHA involved in the procurement and provision of
these materials? Yes/No
10. Does the GPHA have the technical capacity to prevent and/or combat an oil
spill should one occur in Ghana’s oil fields? Yes/No
11. In which other way is the GPHA involved in the prevention and combat of an
oil spill in Ghana’s oil fields?
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APPENDIX 5
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE REGIONAL MARITIME UNIVERSITY
1. The Regional Maritime University (RMU) is the premier training institution for
training local content for Ghana’s offshore industry. Is Basic Offshore Safety
Induction and Emergency Training (BOSIET) / Tropical Basic Offshore Safety
Induction and Emergency Training (TBOSIET) part of the standard training
offered to students? Yes/No
2. If YES to (1) above, is BOSIET/TBOSIET training offered to all students for
the offshore industry or to only those specifically involved in drilling activities?
3. If YES to (1) above, is the BOSIET/TBOSIET training available for personnel
already working in the offshore industry? Yes/No
4. If YES to (1) above, does the BOSIET/TBOSIET training standards conform
to those set by the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation
(OPITO)? Yes/No
5. If NO to (4) above, to which international standards does the RMU’s
BOSIET/TBOSIET training conform?
6. Does the RMU offer re-validation courses for BOSIET/TBOSIET Certificates?
Yes/No
7. If YES to (6) above, after how many years from the issuance of the last
BOSIET/TBOSIET are trainees required to re-validate their Certificates?
8. Does the RMU offer Further Offshore Emergency Training (FOET) / Tropical
Further Offshore Emergency Training (TFOET) training for personnel working
in Ghana’s offshore industry? Yes/No
9. If YES to (8) above, does the FOET/TFOET standards offered by the RMU
conform to OPITO set standards? Yes/No
10. If NO to (9) above, to which international standards do the RMU’s
FOET/TFOET training conform?
11. Does the offshore emergency training courses offered by the RMU include
prevention of spillages of oil at the oil fields? Yes/No
12. Does the offshore emergency training courses offered by the RMU include
combat of spillages of oil at the oil fields? Yes/No
13. Does the RMU’s training require trainees to have a Minimum Industry
Standard Training (MIST) Certificate? Yes/No
14. Does the RMU offer MIST courses for trainees? Yes/No
15. If YES to (14) above, does the RMU’s MIST course conform to OPITO set
standards? Yes/No
16. If NO to (15) above, to which standards does the RMU’s MIST courses
conform?
17. If YES to (14) above, does the RMU’s MIST course conform to local
conditions? Yes/No
18. Does the RMU offer any other internationally recognized courses for offshore
training geared towards prevention and combat of an oil spill? Yes/No
19. If YES to (18) above, which courses are these?
20. Is there any further information you can give us regarding training of personnel
for the offshore industry towards prevention and combat of oil spills in Ghana’s
offshore industry?
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APPENDIX 6
QUESTIONNAIRE/STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE OIL FIELD OPERATORS
Name of Company: …………………………………………………………………………
1. International Conventions prescribe the protection of the marine environment
by all users of the maritime domain. As a potential contributor to degradation
of the marine environment in Ghana’s oil fields, is your company well placed
with regards to protection of the marine environment due to pollution
emanating from your activities? Yes/No
2. Has your company considered the possibility of a spillage during your
operations, e.g., a blowout? Yes/No
3. Do you have active measures in place to prevent pollution of the marine
environment due to your activities? Yes/No
4. If YES to (3) above, which measures do you have in place?
5. If YES to (3) above, were these measures prescribed by law or they are your
normal operating procedures?
6. Do you have Blow Out Preventers (BOPs) on all your well heads to prevent
potential damage to the marine environment? Yes/No
7. If YES to (6) above, how often are the BOPs checked for possible malfunction?
8. Do you have active measures in place to combat a spillage should one occur
due to your operations? Yes/No
9. If YES to (8) above, which measures do you have in place?
10. Do you have booms on site to contain a spillage should one occur due to your
operations? Yes/No
11. If YES to (10) above, how wide an area can your booms cover?
12. Do you have a containment chamber(s) on site to help contain an oil spillage
should one occur due to your operations? Yes/No
13. If YES to (12) above, how much oil/pollutant can the chamber(s) contain?
14. Do you have dispersants on site to help mitigate the effects of an oil spill
should one occur due to your operations? Yes/No
15. If YES to (14) above, how often are they checked/changed?
16. Do you have any other oil spill combating materials on site to mitigate the
effects of a spill during your operations, should one occur? Yes/No
17. If YES to (16) above, what are they?
18. Does your company regularly perform oil spill emergency drills? Yes/No
19. If YES to (18) above, how often?
20. Does your company have an Oil Spill Contingency Plan/Procedure as set out
by the Manual on Oil Spill Contingency Planning of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO)? Yes/No
21. If YES to (20) above, are your staff well versed in the Plan?
22. Does your company have any relationship with international organisations to
be able to call for help in combating a spillage should one occur due to your
operations? Yes/No
23. If YES to (22) above, which organisations are these?
24. If YES to (22) above, how soon can your company expect a response from
these organisations:
12 hours
24 hours
36 hours
48 hours
72 hours
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25. Does your company collaborate with other operators in the oil fields towards
oil spill preparedness and combat? Yes/No
26. Does your company have joint oil spill emergency drills with other operators in
the oil fields? Yes/No
27. If YES to (26) above, how often?
28. Has your company identified any natural collection sites to use in case of a
spillage due to your operations? Yes/No
29. Does your company have a log of currents and flow patterns in the oil fields
where you operate? Yes/No
30. Does your company have a log of estimated currents and deflection angles in
the oil fields where you operate? Yes/No
31. Has your company identified any tidal considerations to be factored into your
operations in the event of an oil spill due to your operations? Yes/No
32. Is your company well placed to use double barrier technique in the event of an
oil spill due to your operations? Yes/No
33. Is your company well placed to use deflection booming in the event of an oil
spill due to your operations? Yes/No
34. Does your company have stand-by boats for debris collection, boom
deployment? Yes/No
35. Does your company have shore sealing booms, in case of an oil spill due to
your operations? Yes/No
36. Does your company have a pre-spill Plan as part of your Standard Operating
Procedures? Yes/No
37. If YES to (36) above, is this pre-spill Plan integrated into your Oil Spill
Contingency Plan? Yes/No
38. Does your company have any funding mechanism set aside to respond to an
oil spill, should one happen due to your operations? Yes/No
39. Does your company engage your staff in periodic pre-spill training and
simulation, e.g., BOSIET? Yes/No
40. Has your company identified any high risk areas in your field of operations?
Yes/No
41. Does your company have the ability to assess any environmental damage that
may happen due to your operations? Yes/No
42. Does your company have the ability for restoration after decommission of your
wells? Yes/No
43. Is your company able to effect compensation for any environmental damage
due to an oil spill as a result of your operations?
44. What other preparations has your company made towards the
prevention/combat of an oil spill should one occur due to your operations?
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APPENDIX 7
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION
1. Are you aware of the on-going drilling activities in the waters off your coast?
Yes/No
2. If YES to (1) above, how did you get to know?
- I heard it on the news
- I saw them when I went fishing
- I was told by the drilling companies
- I was told by a Government representative (Assembly member, DCE)
- Other (Please specify)
3. Has the drilling activities off your coast in any way affected your daily life?
Yes/No
4. If YES to (3) above, in what way?
- It has limited our fishing grounds
- It makes us go further to get any catch
- We are not allowed to fish in the area
- We are not allowed to use outboard motors in the area
- Other (Please specify)
5. Has any compensation been paid to your community for the disruption of your
livelihood? Yes/No
6. If YES to (5) above, by whom?
- By the drilling companies
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE)
- By Government employees from Accra
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
- Other (Please specify)
7. Has any sensitization been conducted in your community on what to do to
prevent accidents at the oil fields? Yes/No
8. If YES to (7) above, by whom?
- By the drilling companies
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE)
- By Government employees from Accra
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
- Other (Please specify)
9. Does regular sensitization on how to prevent an accident at the oil fields take
place in your community? Yes/No
10. If YES to (9) above, how regularly?
- Once a year
- Twice in a year
- Three times in a year
- Once every quarter
- Other (Please specify)
11. If YES to (9) above, by whom?
- By the drilling companies
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE)
- By Government employees from Accra
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
- Other (Please specify)
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12. Has any sensitization been conducted in your community on how to combat a
spillage should one occur? Yes/No
13. If YES to (12) above, by whom?
- By the drilling companies
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE)
- By Government employees from Accra
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
- Other (Please specify)
14. If NO to (12) above, are you aware of how to combat a spillage of oil should
one occur at the oil fields? Yes/No
15. If YES to (14) above, how did you know?
- Folklore passed down from generation to generation
- Past experience
- Cultural practices of our area
- Other (Please specify)
16. Does regular sensitization on how to combat a spillage should one occur in
the oil fields take place in your community? Yes/No
17. If YES to (16) above, by whom?
- By the drilling companies
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE)
- By Government employees from Accra
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
- Other (Please specify)
18. Has any spillage occurred in your community since the commencement of
drilling activities? Yes/No
19. If YES to (18) above, was it combated? Yes/No
20. If YES to (19) above, by whom?
- By the drilling companies
- By Government employees from Accra
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA)
- By ourselves (local community)
- Other (Please specify)
21. If YES to 18 above, was any compensation paid to your community for the
spillage? Yes/No
22. Do you feel capable enough to help combat a spillage should one occur at the
oil fields? Yes/No
23. Is there any other information you can give us with regards to combating an
oil spill at the oil fields?
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